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ABSTRACT 
 
MIN ZHAO: Thinking About What You Don’t Think About: The Role of  
Mental Simulation in Preference Consistency and New Product Evaluation 
(Under the direction of Steve Hoeffler and Gal Zauberman) 
 
According to the accessibility-diagnosticity framework, momentarily more accessible 
aspects of a product can have a disproportionate influence over the evaluation of the product 
by blocking other aspects of the product that are less accessible, yet perhaps more diagnostic. 
In the three essays of my dissertation, I investigate how to use different types of mental 
simulation to enhance the accessibility of the naturally ignored information to overcome 
related negative consequences. 
In essay 1, I combine research on choice over time and process vs. outcome-focused 
mental simulation. Choice over time research indicates that high-level desirability 
considerations are more accessible for the distant future and low-level feasibility 
considerations are more accessible for the near future, leading to preference inconsistency 
over time. I propose that preference consistency could be achieved through: 1) outcome 
simulation (which is focused on the desirability consideration of an event) for the near future, 
or 2) process simulation (which is focused on the feasibility consideration of an event) for the 
distant future, due to the complementary role of each type of mental simulation at each point 
in time. In addition, I propose that time is a key factor that could potentially explain the 
 
 
 
 
 
  
conflicting findings in the mental simulation literature regarding the effectiveness of process 
vs. outcome simulation.  
In essay 2, I investigate the domain of new products and find that while high-level 
desirability considerations appear more accessible than low-level feasibility considerations 
for incrementally new products (INPs), really new product (RNPs) are represented with both 
the desirability and feasibility considerations. As such, the traditional process and outcome 
simulation do not differ in terms of their impact on product evaluations for RNPs. However, 
when examining the specific information processing modes with a cognitive or affective 
focus, I find that outcome simulation is more effective at increasing the evaluation of RNPs 
than process simulation under a cognitive mode, whereas the reversal is true under an 
affective mode. Further, the degree of planning and level of uncertainty and are found to 
partially mediate this interactive effect.  
In essay 3, I switch to a different dimension of consumers’ mental representations 
when evaluating new products: memory vs. imagination-focused representations. I 
demonstrate that people naturally rely on the more readily accessible images from their past 
memories while neglecting imaginative new activities. I propose and test the effect of the 
imaginative-focused visualization strategy which enhances the naturally neglected 
imaginative new uses of the RNPs and leads to higher evaluation for RNPs. In addition, 
essay 3 indicates that ease of imagination directly impacts product evaluation for RNPs such 
that higher ease leads to higher evaluations. In all three studies of essay 3, focus of 
visualization and ease of visualization have a limited role on the evaluation of INPs. 
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CHAPTER 1 -- INTRODUCTION 
 
Human beings are thought to be “cognitive misers” who are reluctant to perform 
extensive thinking and take shortcuts whenever they can (Fiske and Taylor 1991). When 
making decisions, we rely on the pieces of information that are most easily accessible at the 
moment of the decision (Feldman and Lynch 1988; Schwarz et al. 1991; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974). This momentarily activated cognition often has disproportionate influence 
over the judgment and blocks representations which could be more diagnostic (Feldman and 
Lynch 1988), especially when people are not motivated to invest high effort into a decision 
task and simply perceive the mere accessibility as diagnosticity (Menon and Raghubir 2003). 
As a result, inaccurate judgment follows (Feldman and Lynch 1988). 
Although the accessibility-diagnosticity framework (Feldman and Lynch 1988) 
originated in measurement research, in the domain of consumer decision making, relying on 
one aspect of a product that is naturally more accessible to drive an evaluation while 
neglecting other aspects is a common phenomenon. This unidirectional reliance on a single 
aspect of a product which blocks other aspects could cause consequences such as preference 
inconsistency over time (e.g. Liberman and Trope 1998) or lowered evaluation for new 
products (e.g. Dahl and Hoeffler 2004; Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001). Those consequences are 
rather negative. For example, preference inconsistency leads to over-commitment in the 
distant future but regret or procrastination in the near future (Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002; 
Lynch and Zauberman, in press; Zauberman and Lynch 2005), or more specifically in the 
 
 
 
 
 
  
consumer domain, consequences such as purchase of products with promising mail-in-
rebates to be redeemed in the distant future but low redemption motivation in the near future 
(Soman 1998). Similarly, new products provide consumers with novel benefits which may 
ultimately improve a consumer’s life. However, lower evaluation for novel benefits leads to 
low adoption and hinders consumers from appreciating and utilizing these new benefits. 
From the marketer’s point of view, increasing new product adoption is important due to the 
costly product development, short life cycle and fierce competition (Herzenstein, Posavac 
and Brakus 2006). 
To avoid those negative consequences by helping consumers achieve consistent 
preferences and enhance evaluation of new product, it is important to understand which 
aspects of the products are naturally more accessible, and to find mental strategies to help 
consumers augment these natural representations with less accessible, but perhaps more 
diagnostic, information. Such is the main objective of this dissertation. At the same time, 
while drawing on research on mental simulation to seek appropriate mental strategies for the 
scenarios described above, this dissertation suggests a potential explanation to the present 
contradictory findings in the mental simulation literature regarding the effectiveness of 
different types of simulation, as well as unconfounds the interference between simulation 
type and cognitive vs. affective information processing mode in the traditional mental 
simulation literature (Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004; Taylor et al. 1998; Taylor and Pham 
1999). 
According to Feldman and Lynch (1988), which cognitions receive momentary 
activation is a function of the environmental cues directing attention to some aspects of the 
object’ features. Thus, depending on the situation, people mentally focus on different aspects 
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of a product. There are many dimensions that could describe the different aspects of any 
product. “Using a photo book software” for example, could be identified in totally different 
ways such as “creating a photo book and preserving memories,” “downloading and installing 
the software package,” “something different from making a manual album like I used to do,” 
or “cool new technology I’ll try soon.” In any specific situation, one or several of these 
mental representations will become more accessible in one’s mind, be perceived as more 
diagnostic, block other aspects of consideration and influence the final decision of which 
software to choose. In the three essays of this dissertation, two important dimensions that 
influence consumers when they evaluate products will be discussed: level of mental 
representation (i.e. high level desirability representation vs. low level feasibility 
representation) and focus of mental representation (i.e. memory-focused or imagination 
focused), respectively. I investigate factors that impact the natural accessibility of different 
levels of those two dimensions. More importantly, I propose mental simulation strategies to 
alter the accessibility of different levels on each dimension while addressing the 
contradictory findings regarding the effectiveness of different types of simulation and the 
possible confounds in the traditional mental simulation literature.  
 
LEVEL OF MENTAL REPRESENTATION 
Level of Mental Representation 
Cognitive and social-cognitive research has proposed level of mental representation as 
a systematic difference in the representation of items: concepts that are more closely related 
to the perceived essence of things and have greater explanatory power are categorized as 
abstract representations whereas concepts that are peripheral are defined as concrete 
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representations (Medin 1989). More relevant to the current work, previous research on action 
identification suggests that actions may be represented in terms of superordinate or 
subordinate goals. Superordinate goals are related with the abstract “why” aspects of an 
action reflecting the end state, whereas the subordinate goals are related more with the 
specific “how” details of the action reflecting the means (Vallacher and Wegner 1987). 
Construal level theory incorporates this distinction between the end and means and 
differentiates between high-level desirability related representations which corresponds to the 
end state in the goal literature, vs. low-level feasibility related representations that refers to 
the means to achieve the goal (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Lieberman 2003). For 
example, a high-level desirability-related representation may represent “creating a photo 
book” as “preserving memories in a nice way” rather than as “downloading a software” or 
“editing the pictures” as examples of low-level feasibility-related representations.  
 
Factors Impacting Desirability vs. Feasibility Related Level 
Recent research has proposed that the natural mental representations of an event vary 
depending on the temporal distance (Liberman and Trope 1998). When people make a 
decision for the distant future, their decision is based more on the consideration of the high 
level desirability aspect of the product that emerges automatically and becomes more 
accessible. However, they underweigh feasibility considerations that may be more diagnostic. 
On the contrary, when people make a product choice for the near future, they rely more on 
the low level feasibility aspect of the product (e.g. ease of using) that is naturally evoked and 
more accessible. However, they neglect the desirability aspects (e.g. product benefits) that 
could have been more diagnostic (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2000, 
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2003). As a result, people would prefer higher-quality options for the distant future but easier 
options for the near future, which results in inconsistent preference over time. As noted 
earlier, this inconsistent preference would lead to negative consequences such as regret or 
low customer satisfaction from ordering a high-quality, but hard-to-use product, and ending 
up not using it at all. Essay 1 of this dissertation will examine this specific context where 
temporal distance impacts the mental representation of a product. 
In essay 2, I move to the context of new product learning and explore how 
incrementally new products (INPs) and really new products (RNPs) differ in term of the 
natural mental representations when consumers evaluate them. Recent research has suggested 
that similar to temporal distance, there are three other dimensions of psychological distances 
– spatial distance, social distance and hypotheticality, following the general rule that the 
more distal entities (which are more remote from direct experience) have a mental construal 
that is naturally more accessible at a higher level (Liberman, Trope and Stephan, 2006). 
Intuitively, one would think that for INPs which are closer to people’s direct experiences, the 
feasibility considerations at a lower level will be more accessible, whereas for RNPs which 
are more remote from people’s experiences, the desirability related aspects at a higher level 
will be more accessible. However, a comparison between the INPs and RNPs indicates that 
these products differ on other important dimensions as well. For example, an essential 
difference is product complexity (the extent to which people can figure out how to use the 
product) and the related degree of uncertainty (Hoeffler 2003): For INPs, people understand 
the link between features and benefits and have low uncertainty, whereas for RNPs, people 
have difficulty in understanding how to use the product have higher uncertainty, which might 
prevent them from ignoring the low-level product usage related thoughts. Therefore, I believe 
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that the natural representations of INPs vs. RNPs are more impacted by these different 
learning mechanisms due to product complexity, rather than just the general psychological 
distance mechanism. 
Past research in product learning demonstrated that higher prior knowledge leads to 
higher confidence and lowered motivation of information processing (Wood and Lynch 
2001). In addition, studies showed that for products with lower complexity, people pay more 
attention to the product benefits and ignore the usage process, whereas for products with 
higher complexity, people would consider both the benefits and the usage process 
(Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001). Thus, I argue that for INPs, desirability focused considerations 
about the salient benefits will be naturally more accessible than the feasibility focused 
considerations about the usage process. However, for RNPs, consumers have a high 
motivation to pay attention to different aspects of the products including the product benefits 
and specific usage situations. This is, RNPs are naturally represented with both desirability 
and feasibility considerations. This specific context where product complexity impacts to 
level of mental representation of a product will be examined in essay 2. 
 
Augmenting the Naturally Neglected Mental Representation 
Elaboration or rehearsal of an information item increases its accessibility and related 
diagnosticity (Feldman and Lynch 1988; Gollwitzer 1999; Sherman et al. 1978). Thus, I 
expect that in the contexts described above, with varying temporal distance and product 
complexity, encouraging people to engage in extensive thinking by activating the mental 
construal that is naturally neglected and less accessible, will lead to more accurate product 
appraisals, inducing preference consistency over time and higher evaluation of RNPs.  
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Research in mental simulation has identified two distinctive types of simulation: 
outcome simulation that is focused on the desirable outcome of achieving the goal (i.e. the 
desirability aspect) versus process simulation that is focused on the process of going through 
the steps of reaching a goal (i.e., the feasibility aspect) (Taylor et al. 1998). This is consistent 
with the differentiation in the goal striving literature between the pre-decisional deliberate 
mindset as of “why” to pursue a certain goal vs. the post-decisional implemental mindset as 
of “how” to implement the goal (Armor and Taylor 2003; Taylor and Gollwitzer 1995). The 
majority of the research has indicated that process simulation is more effective for goal 
attainment than outcome simulation (Taylor et al. 1998). Or in the language of goal striving 
literature, when people have implementation intentions and specify the when, where, and 
how responses which leads to goal attainment, these situations will become mentally 
activated and thus more easily accessible, which leads to more effective goal attainment 
(Gollwitzer 1999). However, other studies found that outcome simulation could also lead to 
higher performance than process simulation (Taylor and Pham 1999). Drawing on research in 
mental simulation in essay 1 and essay 2, I identify the unique effectiveness of process or 
outcome simulation in terms of achieving preference consistency over time and higher RNP 
evaluations by altering the accessibility of different aspects of a product.  
At the same time, essay 1 and essay 2 seek to contribute to the mental simulation 
literature by solving two major problems in mental simulation research:  
1) As illustrated above, there are contradictory findings in terms of whether process 
or outcome simulation is more effective (Taylor et al. 1998; Taylor and Pham 1999). So far, 
the proposed explanations for the opposite findings such as task complexity remain only 
conjectures, as Taylor and Pham (1999) conclude that it is unclear which factor is responsible 
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for the different findings. Essay 1 will take the temporal perspective and offer a time-based 
explanation for the contradictory findings. 
   2) A closer look at the traditional mental simulation manipulations reveals a confound 
in mental simulation research: Process simulation in the psychology literature puts more 
emphasis on the cognitive components by directing people to think about the step-by-step 
process of doing something, while outcome simulation focuses on the affective components 
by instructing people to imagine the feeling or the joy of achieving something (Pham and 
Taylor 1999; Taylor et al. 1998). Although research in marketing tries to incorporate both 
cognitive and affective components into the process and outcome simulation instructions 
(Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004), it is likely that both components will interfere with each 
other and cancel out the unique effect of each type of mental simulation. Essay 2 will tease 
apart the cognitive and affective processing mode and investigate the unique effect of process 
and outcome simulation on the evaluation of RNPs under each processing mode.  
 
FOCUS OF MENTAL REPRESENTATION 
Since new product learning is an important area in marketing, I discuss another 
dimension in the new product domain that is associated with different types of information 
that are naturally more accessible: memory vs. imagination focused mental representation 
(Dahl, Chattopadhyay and Gorn 1999; Childers and Houston 1983; Perky 1910). Memory 
images refer to events or occasions that have been personally experienced or observed 
whereas imagination images refer to a new, never-before-experienced event (Perky 1910). 
Past research has found that differentiating between memory and imagination focused images 
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is important in learning, mood and affect, problem-solving (Adeyemo 1990, 1994) and new 
product design (Dahl, Chattopadhyay and Gorn 1999). 
I believe the distinction between memory and imagination-focused considerations is 
important for the evaluation of RNPs which offer novel features and benefits. By definition, 
memory images are more accessible since they are related with past experiences that are 
stored somewhere in the memory and are retrievable. Imagination images, on the other hand, 
can not be directly retrieved from the memory and need to be constructed (Bettman, Luce 
and Payne 1998). Cognitive miser theory and accessibility-diagnosticity framework would 
predict that consumers would rely on the more accessible and thus seemingly more 
diagnostic images based on past activities when they evaluate a new product (Fiske and 
Taylor 1991; Feldman and Lynch 1988; Menon and Raghubir 2003). However, research has 
shown that it is the naturally less accessible imagination-focused thoughts that facilitated 
innovative problem solving or new product design (Adeyemo 1990; Dahl, Chattopadhyay 
and Gorn 1999). Accordingly, one would expect that when consumers focus on the 
imaginative aspect of RNPs, product evaluation would be higher. On the other hand, memory 
images that are confined to previous experiences would limit the full appreciation of the 
novel benefits that RNPs provide. 
Thus, in essay 3, I examine the impact of imaginative-focused imagery vs. memory-
based imagery on the evaluation of really new products (RNPs). In previous research the 
critical finding for my purpose is that when evaluating a RNP, people naturally use the more 
accessible images which are biased towards product usage from their existing memories 
(while neglecting the imaginative usages). In a similar fashion to the prior two essays, I 
enhance imaginative-focused visualization and demonstrate that enhancing the naturally 
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neglected imaginative aspects of an RNP leads to higher evaluations. Further, the role of 
perceived ease/difficulty of the visualization is examined on the efficacy of the imaginative 
focused visualization, which is beyond the traditional focus on retrieval from past memories 
in the existing ease of accessibility literature (Schwarz et al. 1991; Schwarz 1998). The 
results demonstrate that making the imaginative visualization more difficult or easier directly 
impacted the evaluation of the RNP. Finally, the effects of type of visualization strategy and 
difficulty of the visualization task are shown to have a limited impact on a more incremental 
product. 
 
In summary, in three essays I am going to investigate circumstances where consumers 
tend to use the most accessible mental representation of the product and neglect other 
possibly more diagnostic dimensions. I propose and show how mental simulation is used to 
activate the naturally less accessible and seemingly less diagnostic representations to 
optimize consumer decisions. Two important dimensions of consumers’ representations 
when they evaluate a product are examined: level of mental representations (high level 
desirability vs. low level feasibility) and the focus of mental representations (memory vs. 
imagination focus). Using process vs. outcome simulation to alter the accessibility of 
representation levels in near and distant future in order to achieve preference consistency 
over time is the objective of essay 1. Using process vs. outcome simulation to alter the 
accessibility of levels of mental representation for RNPs vs. INPs in order to increase product 
evaluation is the focus of essay 2. Using imaginative-focused visualization to encourage the 
naturally ignored imagination-focused product usage consideration for RNPs in order to 
enhance product evaluation is studied in essay 3.  
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In addition, as a contribution to the simulation literature, essay 1 provides a temporal-
based explanation to the conflicting findings in the mental simulation literature regarding the 
effectiveness of each type of simulation. Essay 2 investigates the confound between 
simulation type (outcome vs. process) and information processing mode (cognitive vs. 
affective) by demonstrating the unique effect of each type of simulation under a specific 
processing mode. Essay 3 also extends research on ease of retrieval by showing that ease of 
visualization has a similar role when applied to constructing imaginative new uses. 
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CHAPTER 2 -- ESSAY 1 
MENTAL SIMULATION AND PREFERENCE CONSISTENCY OVER TIME:  
THE ROLE OF PROCESS- VERSUS OUTCOME-FOCUSED THOUGHTS 
 
 
 
Consider the following scenario: A person has just returned from a wonderful trip in 
which she took a lot of digital pictures. She is planning to create a digital photo album for 
this trip and decides to wait for the next three-day weekend to complete the album (which 
occurs next month). After reading a review of various software packages, she selects a 
software package with a high-quality rating, numerous designed themes, and advanced layout 
tools that should take a moderate amount of time and effort to learn and complete the album. 
However, four weeks later, when the time to create the photo album arrives, she focuses on 
the effort associated with installing and learning this software and, ultimately, opts for a 
simpler software package that can be installed and learned more easily but has relatively 
limited functionality.  
The question of whether choosing the simpler software package is a better or worse 
decision is not the focus of this research. Rather, my interest lies in understanding the mental 
processes that are associated with selecting an option (simpler software package) that is 
inconsistent with the original preference (advanced software package). Furthermore, I 
propose and test a method for reducing this preference inconsistency by changing consumers’ 
mental representation of an event using mental simulation. I use these findings to better 
understand preference formation over time and the relationship between two types of mental 
simulation: process-focused and outcome-focused simulation.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
As the preceding scenario illustrates and research on choice over time demonstrates 
(e.g., Soman 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003), temporal distance influences consumers’ 
preferences. Specifically, Trope and Liberman (2003) show that people tend to focus on 
concrete aspects of near-future events and abstract aspects of distant-future events. When 
making a decision that has immediate consequences, people think in more concrete terms, 
putting more weight on low-level components of an option (i.e., how feasible the option is). 
However, when people make a decision about something that is in the more distant future, 
they tend to think in more abstract terms, focusing on the high-level components of an option 
(i.e., how desirable a certain option is). This shift in consideration has been shown to lead to 
temporally inconsistent preferences (Trope and Liberman 2003).  
What might moderate such temporally inconsistent preferences? Suppose that counter 
to the natural (default) consideration pattern, people are encouraged to think about the 
concrete, step-by-step feasibility-related aspects of the software packages (e.g., imagining the 
steps involved to download, install, and learn the software packages) when they make their 
choice for the distant future. Would this change their preference such that their distant-future 
choice is consistent with what they would prefer when the choice is imminent? Conversely, 
what if people are encouraged to think about the more abstract desirability-related aspects of 
the software packages (e.g., imagining how they would feel after their digital photo album is 
created) when they make their choice for the immediate future? Could this lead to changes in 
their preference such that their current choice would be consistent with the choice they had 
indicated when the decision was in the distant future? These questions are important because 
consumers (firms) are interested in maximizing long-term happiness (customer satisfaction). 
Emerging research on the differences between process-focused and outcome-focused 
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simulation (e.g., Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004; Taylor, Pham, Rivkin and Armor 1998) may 
shed some light on ways to prevent inconsistent preferences. 
In the current research, the main objective is to integrate theory from the mental 
simulation literature with the processes that lead to time inconsistent preferences and to 
propose systematic mental strategies to achieve preference consistency. I propose and 
demonstrate that outcome timing can help understand when each type of mental simulation, 
outcome or process, will be more effective in achieving preference consistency.  
 
TIME AND MENTAL REPRESENTATION 
 
Time Inconsistent Preferences and Mental Representation 
Time-dependent changes in preferences have been investigated across different areas in 
the behavioral and social sciences, including behavioral decision-making (e.g., Thaler 1981), 
delay of gratification (e.g., Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez 1989) and self-control (e.g., 
Rachlin 1995). Although research on preference inconsistency has offered mostly affective 
mechanisms to explain temporal shifts (e.g., Ainslie and Haslam 1992; Loewenstein 1996), 
recent theories have focused more on cognitive processes (e.g., Malkoc and Zauberman, 
forthcoming; Trope and Liberman 2003; Zauberman and Lynch 2005). In particular, 
construal level theory (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2000, 2003) proposes 
that temporal distance changes people’s responses to future events by changing the way 
people mentally represent those events. Events in the distant future are more likely to be 
represented in terms of abstract and central features (high-level construals). However, events 
in the near future are more likely to be represented in terms of concrete and peripheral 
features (low-level construals). This shift in mental representation can change attribute 
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weights over time (Liberman and Trope 1998; Soman 1998) as well as alter the decision 
process (Förster, Friedman, and Liberman 2004; Malkoc, Zauberman, and Ulu 2005). 
The temporal shift in how people represent events and process information has 
important implications for the consistency of preferences over time. For the purpose of our 
current work, an important difference between high-level and low-level mental 
representations is the resulting relative importance of desirability versus feasibility 
considerations (Liberman and Trope 1998). Desirability refers to the value of an action’s end 
state, whereas feasibility refers to the ease or difficulty of the means to reach the end state. 
Construal level theory then predicts that temporal distance increases desirability-related 
mental representations and decreases feasibility-related mental representations (Liberman 
and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2000, 2003). As a result of this shift between 
desirability and feasibility, people may have temporally inconsistent preferences, preferring 
more desirable options for the distant future but more feasible options for the near future. For 
example, Liberman and Trope (1998) find that when asking students to choose a distant-
future research assignment, the decision is dominated by the positive outcome of completing 
a project on an interesting topic and students are willing to sacrifice ease for the sake of 
interest. However, when the assignment is due in the near future, the mental representation of 
the assignment is dominated by the amount of time and effort required to finish the project 
and students choose an easy but uninteresting assignment. 
 
Implications of Shifts in Mental Representations for Preference Consistency 
Research on choice over time suggests that intertemporal patterns of evaluation and 
preference could be altered if temporal construal is controlled (Trope and Liberman 2003). 
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To prevent the negative consequences of neglecting the low-level aspects of an action in the 
distant future, one could focus on the concrete details of distant-future events by requiring 
individuals to rehearse, practice, or plan distant-future tasks in full detail (Gollwitzer 1999; 
Trope and Liberman 2003). Alternatively, the self-control literature has indicated that one 
could turn attention away from the concrete qualities of immediate temptation and focus on 
its abstract qualities (Baumeister and Heatherton 1996; Hoch and Lowenstein 1991; Mischel, 
Shoda and Rodriguez 1989). 
To date, however, the idea of altering construal levels using mental control mechanisms 
has not received much attention in the literature on choice over time and self-regulation. 
Furthermore, theories of mental simulation focus mostly on goal attainment rather than 
preferences over time. I use the notion of differing levels of representation to systematically 
examine the effect of different types of mental simulation on preferences. 
 
PROCESS- VERSUS OUTCOME-FOCUSED MENTAL SIMULATION 
Mental simulation is the imitative mental representation of an event or series of 
events (Taylor and Schneider 1989). Prior research distinguishes between process simulation, 
which encourages people to imagine the step-by-step process of reaching a certain goal, and 
outcome simulation, which encourages people to think about the desirable outcome of 
fulfilling the goal (Taylor et al. 1998). Similar to the effect of implementation intentions 
which include the when, where and how aspects of goal attainment (Gollwitzer 1999), 
multiple studies have shown that when people engage in process-focused simulation, their 
performance is superior to those who engage in outcome-focused simulation (Oettingen and 
Mayer 2002; Pham and Taylor 1999; Rivkin and Taylor 1999; Taylor et al. 1998). For 
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example, Pham and Taylor (1999) find that participants who engage in process simulation 
(i.e., visualizing themselves studying for the exam in a way that would lead them to obtain an 
“A”) spend more time studying for the midterm and achieve a higher grade than participants 
who engage in outcome simulation (i.e., visualizing themselves receiving an “A” on the 
exam). In the consumer domain, Escalas and Luce (2003, 2004) show that process-focused 
advertisements facilitate behavioral intentions due to a spontaneous planning process, with 
argument strength playing a moderating role.  
Thus, the classic mental simulation research focuses more directly on performance 
(with the notable recent work of Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004) and the dominant finding has 
demonstrated superior performance under process simulation. Yet I conjecture that when 
each type of mental simulation is implemented in research on choice over time, where people 
need to make trade-offs between high-level desirability and low-level feasibility 
considerations, each type of mental simulation (process-focused and outcome-focused) might 
be more effective at a different point in time.  
 
Simulation Type and Preference Consistency over Time 
Combining ideas of process versus outcome simulation with ideas of levels of mental 
representation in the research on choice over time, I propose that process simulation 
encourages a low-level mental representation, highlighting the concrete feasibility-related 
aspects of an event. In contrast, outcome simulation encourages a high-level mental 
representation, highlighting the abstract desirability-related aspects of an event. With this 
association between these two theories in mind, I argue that the pattern of preference 
inconsistency over time could be attenuated by regulating the levels of mental representations 
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with either process simulation or outcome simulation, depending on the temporal distance. In 
formulating our hypotheses, I compared the two types of simulation with the natural 
preference (i.e., no simulation) at different points in time (i.e., distant versus near future). 
 
Near Future  
For events in the immediate future, concrete feasibility-focused mental representations 
are naturally evoked, and abstract desirability-related representations are neglected. As a 
result, process simulation, which redundantly focuses on concrete thoughts, may not be 
effective in shifting preferences to be consistent with those naturally occurring in a distant-
future setting. However, an outcome simulation that focuses on the favorability of the event 
could activate the high-level representations and increase desirability-related considerations. 
As a result, outcome simulation for near-future events may lead to a change in people’s 
preferences, making them more consistent with preferences that naturally arise when making 
decisions for the more distant-future. 
H1a:  Compared with the natural near-future preference, outcome simulation for 
near-future events/options causes a greater change in preference than does 
process simulation. 
 
H1b:  Outcome simulation for the near future leads to greater preference consistency 
over time (i.e., making near-future preferences after outcome simulation more 
consistent with natural distant-future preferences). 
 
Distant Future  
For events in the distant future, abstract desirability-focused mental representations 
naturally play a dominant role, and the concrete feasibility-focused representations are 
neglected. Thus, process simulation could activate concrete representations and increase the 
weight given to feasibility-related considerations of the event. As a result, process simulation 
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for distant-future events may bring consumers’ preferences closer to their preferences in the 
near future when the event is imminent. However, outcome simulation, which focuses on 
abstract desirability-related considerations, may not be effective in changing consumers’ 
preferences, because it redundantly focuses on the naturally evoked high-level desirability-
related thoughts about the distant-future event. 
H2a:  Compared with the natural distant-future preference, process simulation for 
distant-future events/options causes a greater change in preference than does 
outcome simulation. 
 
H2b:  Process simulation for the distant future leads to greater preference 
consistency over time (i.e., making distant-future preferences after process 
simulation more consistent with natural near-future preferences). 
 
EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
The hypotheses were tested in two experiments that examine the ability of outcome 
and process simulation to overcome preference inconsistency over time. In Experiment 1, I 
adapted a basic assignment choice scenario used in prior research on temporal construal 
(Liberman and Trope 1998). This allows me to replicate the existing findings and then isolate 
the impact of simulation type. In Experiment 2, I use a multiattribute consumer product 
(photo album software package) to test the impact of mental simulation type in an 
environment that requires consumers to trade off their effort against product performance. 
The general task in both experiments involves evaluating two options that are associated with 
different levels of feasibility and desirability. In addition, consistent with prior research (e.g., 
Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2000), the timing manipulation had 
participants making the evaluation either in the near future (today or in a couple of days, 
depending on the task) or in the distant future (two or three months later).  
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Importantly, in both experiments, before evaluating the options, participants in the 
simulation conditions performed mental simulation that focused on either the process or the 
outcome associated with each option. In the mental simulation literature, process simulation 
has focused on a series of steps, or tasks, that are aimed to aid the completion of the focal 
goal (Taylor et al. 1998). Conversely, participants in the outcome simulation condition 
focused on experiencing the feelings associated with achieving a positive outcome (Taylor et 
al. 1998).   
In the consumer domain, Escalas and Luce (2004) adapted the traditional process and 
outcome simulation manipulations toward preference in an advertising context. In their 
process simulation conditions, participants were asked to “focus on how you would 
incorporate this shampoo (vitamins) into your daily routine” (Escalas and Luce 2004, p. 282-
3). Whereas, in the outcome simulation conditions participants were asked to “Imagine how 
you would feel if your looks improved (health improved) as a result of the shampoo 
(vitamins),” (Escalas and Luce 2004, p. 283). Our manipulations of process and outcome 
simulation mirrored the language used in these prior manipulations.  
The primary dependent variable in both experiments is the relative preference 
between the two options (choice was also included in Experiment 2). To test the hypotheses 
associated with change of preference, I first computed a series of planned contrasts. To 
examine the impact of timing and simulation type further, I performed an additional analysis 
that combined theoretically similar conditions (control and process simulation in the near 
future conditions or control and outcome simulation in the distant future conditions). These 
converging sets of analyses allow me to test the relative effects of simulation type at different 
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points in time. In Experiment 2, I supplement the preference data with choice, as well as 
analysis of the coding of participants’ written simulation protocols. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Participants and design.  A total of 189 students at a major southeastern university 
completed the experiment to fulfill a research requirement for an introductory marketing 
course. The experiment was a 2 (time: near future, distant future) x 3 (simulation: control, 
outcome simulation, process simulation) between-subjects design. 
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions. 
In all conditions, participants were asked to imagine that they needed to turn in a class 
assignment that required reading a chapter and discussing several questions about it 
(Liberman and Trope 1998). There were two topics from which they could choose: Topic A 
was very interesting but required a great deal of effort. Topic B was less interesting but did 
not require as much effort. Each topic was described in general terms and no specific 
information about the topics was given (See Appendix A). The order of the two topics was 
counterbalanced.  
Participants in the simulation conditions were asked to perform process or outcome 
simulation. Consistent with prior research (Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004), process simulation 
instructions focused on the activities associated with completing the assignment, whereas 
outcome simulation instructions focused on the benefits associated with completing the 
assignment (see the Appendix A for the exact wording). 
To ensure that participants performed the mental simulations, they were asked to write 
down a detailed list of their thoughts following the simulation exercise. After reading the 
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scenario and performing the mental simulation exercise or just reading the scenario (in the 
control conditions), all participants were asked to indicate their likelihood of choosing that 
topic on a ten-point scale, anchored at 1 (“extremely unlikely”) and 10 (“extremely likely”). 
Subsequently, participants were asked to indicate their relative preference between these two 
topics on a scale anchored at 1 (“definitely topic A”) and 10 (“definitely topic B”). In the 
near-future conditions, the assignment was due a week later, whereas in the distant-future 
conditions, the assignment was due at the beginning of next semester, which was about three 
months from the time participants were completing the questionnaires.  
 
Results  
The main dependent measure was the relative preference between the high-feasibility 
and high-desirability options. Note that higher scores represent greater preference for the 
higher-feasibility/lower-desirability option (the less interesting but easy topic). In addition, 
note that a key feature of the design is that (1) the control conditions are hypothesized to 
change over time in accordance with prior research and (2) mental simulations are 
hypothesized to change preference at different points in time – outcome simulation in the 
near future and process simulation in the distant future. Thus, to test the theoretical 
predictions, I present two sets of analyses.  
The first analysis consists of a series of planned contrasts that match the hypotheses. 
The second analysis is a modified omnibus test that looks directly at the moderating effect of 
timing on the effectiveness of process versus outcome simulation by simultaneously testing 
changes in preference by combining theoretically similar conditions. Complete details are 
provided below.   
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Replicating prior findings (control conditions). The pattern of results for the control 
conditions replicated prior findings (e.g., Liberman and Trope 1998) with a marginally 
significant difference between near- and distant-future preferences (F(1, 183) = 3.00, p = .08, 
ω2 = .032).1 As expected, participants in the near-future condition preferred the easier but 
less interesting topic (M = 6.87) more than those in the distant-future condition (M = 5.83); 
see figure 1. 
Near future. Planned contrasts demonstrate that for the near future, outcome simulation 
causes a change in preferences and leads to temporal preference consistency with the natural 
distant-future preference: Participants who engaged in outcome simulation indicated a 
significantly greater preference toward the interesting but difficult topic (M = 5.60) compared 
with participants in the control condition (M = 6.87; F(1, 183) = 4.71, p < .05, ω2 = .055). 
However, there was no significant difference regarding the relative preference between the 
process simulation condition (M = 6.73) and the control condition (M = 6.87; F(1, 183) = .06, 
p = .81). These results support H1a.  As a result of outcome simulation for the near future, the 
natural intertemporal preference inconsistency is eliminated. Preferences associated with 
outcome simulation for the near future (M = 5.60) were not significantly different from the 
control preference for the distant future (M = 5.83; F(1, 183) = .14, p = .71), in support of H1b.  
Distant future. For the distant future, process simulation causes a change in preferences 
and leads to preference consistency over time with the natural near-future preference: In the 
distant-future conditions, participants in the process simulation condition indicated a 
marginally significant greater preference toward the less interesting but easier topic (M = 
                                                 
1 Throughout the analyses sections in all three essays, I used overall error terms and adjusted degrees of 
freedom for all statistical tests (Winer, Brown, and Michels 1991). In addition, all ω2 values cited in this article 
are partial ω2 (Keren and Lewis 1979), excluding variance due to analysis of variance terms unrelated to the 
tested effect. Partial ω2 = σ2effect / (σ2effect + σ2error). 
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6.93) compared with those in the control condition (M = 5.83; F(1, 183) = 3.32, p < .07, ω2 
= .038).2  However, the preferences associated with the outcome simulation condition (M = 
5.73) were not significantly different from the control condition (M = 5.83; F(1, 183) = .07, p 
= .79). These results provide initial support for H2a. As a result of process simulation for the 
distant future, the natural intertemporal preference inconsistency is eliminated. The 
preferences associated with process simulation for the distant future (M = 6.93) were not 
significantly different from the natural preference of the near future (M = 6.87; F(1, 183) 
= .01, p = .92), which provides support for H2b. 
Because the hypotheses are about a series of planned contrasts with the control 
condition shifting with time (near vs. distant future), the 2-df omnibus interaction is not the 
appropriate test. However, since process simulation for near future and outcome simulation 
for distant future are hypothesized to match the respective default control conditions (match), 
whereas outcome simulation for near future and process simulation for distant future are 
hypnotized to cause preference deviation from the respective control conditions (mismatch), 
it is appropriate to test for a modified 1-df interaction by combining the control with the 
match conditions. Before testing for the modified interaction, two separate ANOVA tests for 
the match and mismatch conditions were conducted: First, I computed a 2 (near vs. distant 
future) x 2 (control vs. match) ANOVA. As expected, no main effects of simulation (F(1,183) 
= .13, p = .71) or interaction between time and simulation (F(1,183) = 0, p = .99) were found. 
Second, I conducted a 2 (near vs. distant future) x 2 (control vs. mismatch) ANOVA. As 
expected, there was a significant interaction between simulation and time (F(1,183) = 7.94, p 
= .005). Thus I combined our control with match conditions and performed a modified 2 
                                                 
2 Process simulation may have had a lesser effect in this case because the experiment was conducted at the end 
of the semester when students may have had a general preference toward easy topics. 
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(near future vs. distant future) x 2 (match vs. mismatch) ANOVA that tested for the unique (1 
df) main effect at each point of time. A significant interaction between time and simulation, 
F(1,185) = 11.07, p < .001 was found. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Discussion 
The results from the control conditions of Experiment 1 replicate prior findings (e.g., 
Liberman and Trope 1998) and demonstrate that people have a relatively stronger preference 
toward the higher-feasibility option for the near future than for the distant future. In support 
of the hypotheses, the results further show that for the near future, outcome simulation 
caused a greater change in preference toward the higher-desirability/lower-feasibility option 
(H1a), leading to preferences that were consistent with the control preference for the distant-
future option (H1b). Conversely, for the distant future, process simulation created a greater 
preference change in favor of the higher-feasibility/lower-desirability option (H2a), leading to 
preferences that were consistent with those in the control condition for the near-future option 
(H2b).  
Why doesn’t process simulation in the near future and outcome simulation in the distant 
future cause any change in preference? My explanation focuses on the natural processing 
characteristics at each point in time. Thus, in the near-future scenario, process simulation 
enhances the dominant processing mode, in which the corresponding focus is on concrete 
feasibility-related thoughts. In contrast, outcome simulation enhances the dominant 
processing mode in the distant future by focusing on abstract desirability-related thoughts. 
Experiment 1 provides direct evidence that process and outcome simulation can be used 
to change preferences and create preference consistency over time. In the next study, I 
 
25 
 
 
 
  
provide further evidence for these results by examining the phenomena in a more typical 
consumption context while increasing the external validity by including choice as a 
dependent variable and increasing the internal validity by using a more subtle and consistent 
manipulation of process and outcome simulation.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 1 provides support for my hypotheses that use of process simulation for the 
distant future and outcome simulation for the near future can help attenuate preference 
inconsistency over time. Yet the task of choosing an assignment may have idiosyncratic 
characteristics that limit our ability to generalize the findings to more typical consumer 
contexts. In Experiment 2, I switch to a different domain (i.e., the choice of a software 
package) to test whether the impact of process- and outcome-based thoughts generalizes to a 
consumption situation with a multiattribute product. In addition, choice was added as a 
dependent variable. Finally, the simulation instructions were modified so that they are more 
closely aligned with those used in the marketing literature (Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004).  
 
Method 
Participants and design. A total of 225 students were recruited at a major southeastern 
university and were paid $5 as compensation. The experiment followed a 2 (time: near future, 
distant future) x 3 (simulation: control, outcome simulation, process simulation) between-
subjects design. 
Stimuli. The basic scenario of the stimuli asked participants to imagine that they had an 
important project (to create a photo essay) for one of their classes that was due either in two 
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days or at the beginning of the next semester, which was a little over two months from the 
time participants completed the questionnaires. The project required the use of a photo album 
software package. There were two software packages from which participants could choose, 
both of which had free trial versions that could be downloaded from the Web and were valid 
for 48 hours. All projects were to be graded and then posted on the Web. Participants were 
asked to consider the following two options: One software package had a higher PC 
Magazine quality rating (rated as ) with complete image editing features (i.e., 
numerous predesigned themes, improved layout tools). However, this package had a large 
file size and a medium difficulty level, for which downloading, installation, and tutorial were 
estimated to take approximately 45 minutes. The other software package had a lower PC 
Magazine quality rating (rated as ) with some image editing features (i.e., limited 
themes, basic layout tools). However, this package had a small file size and a low difficulty 
level, for which downloading, installation, and tutorial were estimated to take approximately 
10 minutes. Descriptions of both software packages also included an excerpt from a review:  
“allows for the creation of fabulous photo essays, but difficult and time consuming to learn 
and use” for the software package with advanced features, and “some limitations of final 
layout and editing options, but simple to use, easy to learn, and gets the job done” for the 
more limited but easier to use software package (See Appendix B). The order of the software 
packages was counterbalanced. 
Procedure: The process simulation instructions focused on the process of using the 
software package while the outcome simulation instructions focused on the final outcome of 
the project. In addition, instructions for process and outcome simulation contained the same 
number of words (65) and the same structure (for the exact wording, see the Appendix C). In 
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this experiment, I used a similar procedure and dependent measures as were used in 
Experiment 1 but with some additional measures. First, in addition to the preference measure, 
participants’ binary choice between the two options was included. Second, as a manipulation 
check for time, after the main task, participants were asked to rate their perceptions of the 
time gap between now and the due date of the project. Third, participants were then asked to 
indicate how important the capabilities of the software and the difficulty of setting up and 
using the software were to them when they made their decision about which software 
package to choose. Finally, I asked participants to rate how much they thought about the 
process of using the software and the final quality of the project when they were making their 
decisions.  
 
Results  
As in Experiment 1, the main dependent measure was the relative preference between 
the high-feasibility and the high-desirability options. For the relative preference, higher 
scores represent greater preference for the higher-feasibility option (the software package 
that had a low-quality rating but was easier to use), and lower scores represent greater 
preference for the higher-desirability option (the software package that had a high-quality 
rating but was difficult to use). I report similar analyses as those in Experiment 1. In addition, 
I report the choice data, as well as coded responses of participants’ written responses to the 
simulation instructions. Three coders were asked to code participants’ thought protocols 
independently to identify whether each argument was a process- or outcome-related thought. 
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The intercoder reliability was .95 for outcome-related thoughts and .91 for process-related 
thoughts. The coding results of three coders were aggregated.3
Manipulation check. The coded open responses indicate that participants had more 
outcome-related thoughts in the outcome simulation conditions (M =4.73) compared with 
process simulation conditions (M =1.87; F(1,140) = 161.68, p < .001); and that participants 
had more process-related thoughts in the process simulation conditions (M =4.05) than in the 
outcome simulation conditions (M =1.62; F(1,140) = 122.74, p < .005). This indicated that 
the simulation conditions had the intended effect on the type of thoughts participates 
generated, but participants performed overall similar levels of total elaboration for both types 
of simulation (F(1,140) = 1.89, p = .17).  
The effectiveness of the manipulations was further tested using participants’ self-
reports about the importance of process- and outcome-related features in their decisions. I 
calculated the difference between people’s self-reported amount of thinking about the 
process of using the software versus the final quality of the project and found a significant 
main effect of time (F(1, 215) = 4.02, p < .05) and a significant effect of simulation (F(2, 215) 
= 3.28, p < .05) but no significant interaction. I also found similar results for self-reported 
measures of the importance of the software’s capability and the difficulty of setting up and 
using the software; this result shows that outcome simulation increases the importance of 
                                                 
3 The coding revealed that four participants did more than twice the opposite simulation than they were 
instructed to do, and thus I dropped them from the analysis, which resulted in a sample size of 221. The results 
based on all 225 participants (including those who did not follow the instructions) fully replicated the results 
based on 221 participants, except that the simple effect of process simulation in the distant future was not 
significant compared with the distant-future control condition. All other pairwise contrasts and the differencing 
analysis yielded the same results. To test the robustness of the results further, I used analyses with different 
criteria: I conducted analyses based on participants who (1) did not do more of the opposite simulation than the 
simulation that they were supposed to do (N = 213) and (2) did not do more than 1.5 times the opposite 
simulation (N = 214). The results fully replicated the results based on 221 participants.   
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abstract desirability considerations, whereas process simulation increases the importance of 
concrete feasibility considerations. 
In addition, the manipulation check measure of the temporal distance between now and 
the due date of the project confirmed that our time manipulation was successful: Participants 
perceived the time gap in the near-future conditions (M = 4.02) as significantly shorter than 
that in the distant-future conditions (M = 7.39), F(1,219) = 168.58, p < .001.  
Control conditions. Consistent with the predictions of prior research and the results in 
Experiment 1, under no simulation, participants in the near-future condition preferred the 
higher-feasibility software package (M = 7.13) significantly more than participants in the 
distant-future condition (M = 5.42), F(1,215) = 7.60, p < .01, ω2 = .132; see Figure 2. 
Near future: As in Experiment 1, I computed a set of planned contrasts to test the 
relative effectiveness of the different simulation types. Again, the results were fully 
consistent with the hypotheses: In the near-future conditions, there was no significant 
difference in the relative preference between the process simulation condition (M = 7.03) and 
the control condition (M = 7.13), F(1,215) = .03, p = .86. However, participants who engaged 
in outcome simulation (M = 5.59) indicated a significantly greater preference toward the 
higher-desirability software package than participants in the control condition (M = 7.13), 
F(1,215) = 6.04, p < .05, ω2 = .166, in support of H1a. Furthermore, as expected, preferences 
associated with outcome simulation for the near future (M = 5.59) were not significantly 
different from the control preference for the distant future (M = 5.42), F(1,215) = .08, p = .78, 
indicating that the natural preference inconsistency over time was eliminated after outcome 
simulation for the near future, in support of H1b. 
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Distant future: In the distant-future conditions, there was no difference in preferences 
between outcome simulation (M = 5.28) and the control condition (M = 5.42), F(1,215) = .05, 
p = .82. However, after the process simulation, participants indicated a significantly greater 
preference toward the higher-feasibility software package (M = 6.66) than participants in the 
control condition (M = 5.42), F(1,215) = 3.76, p < .05, ω2 = .266, in support of H2a. 
Furthermore, as a result of process simulation for the distant future, the natural preference 
inconsistency over time was eliminated: There was no difference between the preferences 
after process simulation for the distant future (M = 6.66) and the control preference for the 
near future (M = 7.13), F(1,215) = .55, p = .46, in support of H2b. 
As in Experiment 1, before combining the control and match conditions to test for the 
modified interaction, two separate ANOVAs were run: The 2 (near vs. distant future) x 2 
(control vs. match) ANOVA showed no main effect of simulation (F(1, 215) = .07, p =. 79) 
or interactions between time and simulation (F(1, 215) = 0, p = .96). The 2 (near vs. distant 
future) x 2 (control vs. mismatch) ANOVA indicated a significant interaction between 
simulation and time (F(1, 215) = 9.64, p < .005). Finally, the modified 2 (near future vs. 
distant future) x 2 (match vs. mismatch) ANOVA showed a significant interaction between 
time and simulation, F(1,217) = 12.89, p < .001, supporting the hypotheses 
----------------------------------- 
Insert figure 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Choice. For the choice between software packages, an overall chi-square test showed a 
significant difference between participants’ choices across the six conditions (χ2(5) = 17.14, p 
< .005, ω2 = .078). Overall, the results replicated the preference results. As predicted, in the 
control conditions, the percentage of people who chose the higher-feasibility software 
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package for the near future (M = 72%) was significantly greater than the percentage of people 
who chose the same software package for the distant future (M = 42%); χ2(1) = 6.93, p <.01, 
ω2 = .09. In terms of the effect of mental simulation, when the choice was for the near future, 
the percentage of people who chose the higher-feasibility software package after process 
simulation (M = 78%) did not change compared with that in the control condition (M = 72%; 
χ2(1) = .35, p = .55). However, after outcome simulation, the percentage of people who chose 
this software package (M = 49%) significantly decreased compared with that in the control 
condition (M = 72%); χ2(1) = 4.26, p < .05, ω2 = .056, which provides additional support for 
H1a. Furthermore, outcome simulation in the near future led to consistent choices over time 
as there was no difference between the percentage of people who chose the higher-feasibility 
software package after outcome simulation for the near-future (M = 49%) and the natural 
distant-future condition (M = 42%; χ2(1) = .32, p = .57), which provides further support for 
H1b.  
Conversely, when participants made a choice for the distant future, there was no 
significant difference between outcome simulation (M = 44%) and the control condition (M = 
42%); χ2(1) = .04, p = .84. However, the percentage of people who chose the higher-
feasibility software package after process simulation (M = 63%) increased (marginally) 
compared with that in the control condition (M = 42%); χ2(1) = 3.14, p < .08, ω2 = .043, 
which provides further support for H2a.  In support of H2b, I again find that process 
simulation for the distant future led to consistent choices over time, as I did not observe a 
difference between the percentage of people who chose the higher-feasibility software 
package after process simulation in the distant-future (M = 63%) and that in the natural near-
future condition (M = 72%); χ2(1) = .67, p = .41. 
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Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1 and prior literature, 
demonstrating that people have inconsistent preferences over time: a relatively stronger 
preference toward the higher-feasibility/lower-desirability option in the near future and a 
stronger preference toward the higher-desirability/lower-feasibility option in the distant 
future. In support of the hypotheses, I again demonstrated that outcome simulation for near-
future options changed preferences in favor of the higher-desirability/lower-feasibility option. 
In addition, process simulation for distant-future options changed preferences toward the 
higher-feasibility/lower-desirability option. This general pattern of results held for both 
relative preference and choice. These results were obtained in a more typical consumption 
context with a multiple-attribute product set that forced participants to perform benefit–effort 
trade-offs, while using a more subtle and consistent manipulation of process and outcome 
simulation. The open-ended responses, as well as participants’ self-reports, further indicate 
that the simulation manipulation employed had the intended effects.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this research, a temporal-based mental mechanism from the mental simulation 
literature was employed toward the goal of achieving preference consistency over time. I 
hypothesize and demonstrate in two experiments that preference inconsistency over time can 
be attenuated by regulating levels of mental representations with either process simulation or 
outcome simulation, depending on the temporal distance.  
Taken together, the findings of essay 1 suggest that for near-future options, where 
concrete feasibility-related thoughts are naturally focused upon and desirability is relatively 
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ignored, process simulation does not change the focus of people’s thoughts and thus does not 
change their preferences. However, outcome simulation enables preferences in the near-
future to be consistent with preferences that are developed in distant-future scenarios, 
because outcome simulation focuses on abstract desirability-related thoughts, with relatively 
less emphasis on feasibility, similar to the natural tendency found when evaluating distant-
future options. In terms of distant-future options, where the focus is on abstract desirability, 
rather than concrete feasibility, outcome simulation does not change the focus of people’s 
thoughts and therefore does not change their preferences. In these cases, process simulation 
is better able to bring preferences into line with natural near-future preferences, by shifting 
the focus away from abstract desirability-related thoughts and toward concrete feasibility-
related thoughts. 
 
Consistent Yet Different Preferences 
The studies show a preponderance of support for the notion that specific types of 
simulation can create preference consistency across time. Thinking about the process of 
setting up and using a software package (in three months) ultimately led consumers to think 
as if they were choosing the software today. Thinking about the long-term benefit of the 
project (when making an immediate decision) ultimately lead consumers to think more like 
they were making a future decision. For both time frames (near and distant future), our 
explanation is based on the idea that a previously ignored (or underweighted) aspect of the 
decision is incorporated into the decision after simulation. Yet at no point do these 
preferences converge.  
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Thus, the following question remains: Which is the “correct” or “better” preference? 
Is it a mistake to ignore or underweigh the amount of work necessary to learn to use the 
software when selecting for the distant future? Is it wrong when the decision is imminent to 
focus more on this constraint and to undervalue the quality of the project? This is a general 
philosophical issue that I do not attempt to answer in this research. I conjecture that the 
answers to these questions lie in consumers’ ability to trade off short-term pain against long-
term gain, which has both situational- and personality-related dimensions.  
However, from a marketer’s perspective, if there exists a goal of maximizing long-
term satisfaction, one would generally want consumers to form preferences that focus on the 
long-term usefulness rather than the immediate constraints. When immediate constraints 
sway the decision toward the simple, easy to learn software package, long-term satisfaction 
may be compromised. Additionally, if consumers spend more money on the software 
package with more advanced features, but never use those features due to unanticipated 
usage constraints, opting for the more advanced software package could lead to a loss of 
consumer utility. Certainly there are many situations in which the constraints may play an 
important role in consumers’ long-term satisfaction. For example, imagine a consumer who 
purchases a PDA focused entirely on the attractive features (i.e., having all of their contact 
and scheduling information available). If they ignore or underweigh the effort associated 
with learning how to use the product and obtain the benefits (i.e., learning the handwriting 
recognition script and entering all of the information), they may be unsatisfied with their 
purchase. In those situations, ignoring the constraints may leave consumers worse off in the 
long run. Thus, when thinking about preference consistency it is important to understand the 
long-term implications of both constraints and benefits. 
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Asymmetries Associated with Enhancing the Underweighted Processing Mode 
I hypothesize and find that enhancing the naturally underweighted processing mode 
changes preference. I support the notion that process versus outcome manipulations actually 
influence the relative degree of process-/outcome-focused thoughts rather than involving 
either a process-only or an outcome-only focus. I consistently find that the preferences 
associated with enhancing the naturally neglected processing mode were highly different 
from the natural or control group preference. However, there was an interesting pattern to the 
results, illustrated by the choice shares of software packages in Experiment 2: For the distant 
future, process simulation is thought to enhance the focus on the effort required by using the 
software and thus would be expected to lead to a significant increase in the percentage of 
participants who selected the software with less effort required. Yet after process simulation, 
there is only a marginally significant shift (from 42% to 63%) to the easier software.  
It is possible that while participants imagined the process of installing and learning to 
use the software, the step-by-step set-up and learning process ultimately led them to think 
about the benefits of the completed projects. In other words, perhaps participants in the 
process simulation condition thought not only about the process but also about the outcome. 
This conjecture was supported by the coding results of Experiment 2, which showed a 
significant difference regarding the ratio of intended simulation to opposite simulation taken 
from each individual participant: The ratio of outcome-related thoughts to process-related 
thoughts in the outcome conditions was 2.48, whereas the ratio of process-related thoughts to 
outcome-related thoughts was 1.38 in the process simulation conditions (F(1,146) = 6.86, p 
< .05). This is consistent with the findings of previous research which demonstrates that 
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process simulation can include outcome-focused thought (Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004; 
Pham and Taylor 1999).  
 
Moderating Effect of Timing on the Effectiveness of Process Versus Outcome Simulation 
A possible direction of additional research could be the application of these findings 
to better understand the conditions in which process or outcome simulation is more effective. 
The majority of the studies in the mental simulation literature show that process simulation 
has a superior role in increasing performance (Taylor et al. 1998) or behavioral intentions 
(Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004). However, other empirical research has suggested a positive 
role of outcome simulation in terms of goal attainment (Taylor and Pham 1999). Although 
this conflict is not well established, and more definitive research is needed, my framework 
provides an added dimension to research on mental simulation by suggesting a potential 
explanation for these findings. 
I propose that the timing of an event is an important difference between studies 
showing the positive role of process simulation and those indicating a positive role of 
outcome simulation: Studies that show a beneficial role of process simulation are based on 
activities in the relatively distant future (e.g., preparing for an exam after multiple days, see 
Oettingen and Mayer 2002; Pham and Taylor 1999) in which low-level feasibility-related 
thoughts are naturally ignored but can be activated by process simulation. However, the 
study that indicated a positive role of outcome simulation is based on activities in the 
immediate future (e.g., writing the essay in the next hour; see Taylor and Pham 1999), in 
which the high-level desirability-related thoughts were naturally underweighted but could be 
enhanced by outcome simulation. Thus, I suggest that the timing of an event is an important 
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mediator of the effectiveness of process and outcome simulation.  A caution associated with 
my interpretation is that the mental simulation literature has mostly focused on behavior in 
terms of performance, whereas the current studies examine preference. Escalas and Luce’s 
(2003, 2004) findings demonstrate that there are parallels between performance and 
preference, but further research could extend the findings and investigate the moderating 
effect on performance. 
 
Conclusions 
This research has examined the role of process- and outcome-focused mental 
simulation to overcome preference inconsistency over time in domains in which the trade-off 
between desirability and feasibility is required. I demonstrated that outcome simulation, 
which focuses on the abstract high-level desirability consideration could help change 
preference in the near future so that it is consistent with the natural distant-future preference. 
Conversely, process simulation, which focuses on the concrete low-level feasibility 
consideration, could help change preference in the distant future so that it is consistent with 
the natural near-future preference. In sum, this research establishes that mental control 
mechanisms such as the focus of simulation can be used to alter construal levels to achieve 
consistent preferences across different temporal distances. 
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CHAPTER 3 -- ESSAY 2 
 
MENTAL SIMULATION AND THE EVALUATION OF REALLY NEW 
PRODUCTS: THE ROLE OF PROCESS VS. OUTCOME-FOCUSED THOUGHTS 
 
 
 
Really new products (RNPs) allow consumers to do something they have never been 
able to do before. While a RNP may provide a strategic benefit from a competitive 
perspective, it also places a large learning burden on consumers. Indeed, consumers were 
found to have a higher degree of uncertainty associated with a RNP than with an 
incrementally new product (INP) (Hoeffler 2003). In this research, I identify another 
important dimension of RNPs associated with the mental representation that is formed when 
consumers consider the product: a focus on the feasibility of incorporating the product into 
one’s daily routine versus a focus on the desirability of the end benefits. I draw on research 
on new product learning to show that the higher degree of complexity and uncertainty 
associated with RNPs leads to different mental representations of RNPs (compared with 
INPs): While people naturally evoke more desirability-focused considerations about the 
salient benefits than feasibility considerations about the process of using a product for INPs, 
the difference between desirability-focused and feasibility-focused considerations is smaller 
for RNPs.  
More importantly, I propose and demonstrate how mental simulation can be used to 
change the default mental representation of a RNP, and ultimately enhance product 
evaluation. Based on the complementary role of process vs. outcome simulation versus the 
 
 
 
 
 
  
default mental representations (Zhao, Hoeffler and Zauberman 2006), I argue that as people 
naturally ignore the process of using INPs, process simulation activates the naturally ignored 
feasibility considerations which leads to higher product evaluation than outcome simulation. 
On the contrary, for RNPs, there will be no differences regarding the effect on evaluations 
between traditional process and outcome simulation because the gap between the natural 
evoked desirability and feasibility considerations is minimal. After addressing the potential 
confound in the traditional mental simulation literature between affect/cognition and 
simulation type (i.e. process simulation being more cognitive focused and outcome 
simulation more affective focused) (Taylor et al. 1998; Pham and Taylor 1999; Escalas 2003, 
2004), I test the efficacy of each type of mental simulation under a specific information 
processing mode and the following pattern emerges. Outcome simulation is more effective 
than process simulation for product evaluation under a cognitive focus, whereas process 
simulation is more effective than outcome simulation under an affective focus. Additionally, 
I examine the potential mediating role of degree of planning, which has been identified as a 
mediator in the existing mental simulation research (Taylor et al. 1998; Escalas and Luce 
2004). Finally, I examine the role of level of uncertainty which has been identified as a key 
difference between INPs and RNPs (Hoeffler 2003).  
In the current essay, I first draw on research in new product learning and identify the 
default metal construal of RNPs and INPs. Given RNPs’ natural mental representations 
(which are based on both feasibility and desirability related considerations), I review the 
mental simulation literature and propose hypotheses about the effect of process and outcome 
simulation on the evaluation of INPs and RNPs. More importantly, I investigate the potential 
confound of cognitive vs. affective components of mental simulation and predict the unique 
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effect of process vs. outcome simulation for RNPs under cognitive vs. affective processing 
mode. 
 
NEW PRODUCTS AND MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS 
Innovations typically result from a change to or the elimination of product attributes or 
features within an existing category (Goldenberg, Mazursky and Solomon 1999; Moreau, 
Lehmann and Markman 2001). Innovations such as technological breakthroughs that create 
or at least substantially expand a category are defined as RNPs, whereas modifications of an 
existing product or product line extensions are often defined as INPs (Dahl and Hoeffler 
2004; Lehmann 1994; Moreau, Markman and Lehman 2001). Existing research on new 
product learning showed that consumers have greater uncertainty for RNPs than INPs 
(Hoeffler 2003). Specifically, while people have the baseline knowledge or experience in a 
similar domain and are able to understand the link between features and benefits for INPs, it 
is difficult for them to figure out the links between the features and benefits provided by 
those features for RNPs (Hoeffler 2003; Hoeffler and Ariely 1999; Moreau, Lehmann and 
Markman 2001; Veryzer 1998). As such, RNPs are often more complex and require more 
consumer learning. 
In this research, I identify a key difference between RNPs and INPs in consumer 
evaluation: the mental representation of the product in terms of high-level desirability and 
low-level feasibility considerations. The distinction between desirability and feasibility 
corresponds to the distinction between ends and means (Gollwitzer and Moskowitz 1996). 
Desirability refers to an action’s end state, or the high-level “why” aspect of an action. On 
the contrary, feasibility refers to the process of reaching an action, or the low-level “how” 
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aspect of an action (Liberman and Trope 1998; Vallacher and Wegner 1987). When applied 
to product learning, desirability reflects the benefits of using a product (i.e. why using a 
product) whereas feasibility reflects the process of using the product (i.e. how to use the 
product). Since the terms “desirability” and “feasibility” come from research on 
psychological distance (Liberman, Trope and Stephan 2006), one might intuitively expect 
that for INPs, which people are more familiar with and seem to be “closer”, people would 
focus more on the feasibility considerations. Whereas for RNPs, which are less familiar and 
seem to be more “distant”, people would rely more on the desirability related aspects. 
However, as demonstrated in prior research, the essential difference between both types of 
products is product complexity and the related degree of uncertainty (Hoeffler 2003). 
Therefore, I argue that psychological distance does not apply in the evaluation of INPs and 
RNPs. Rather, it is the motivation and capability of learning that impacts what aspects of 
INPs vs. RNPs will be naturally more accessible. 
According to Wood and Lynch (2002), high prior knowledge leads to complacency and 
superficial processing of product information. In this research, high knowledge led to more 
comprehensive learning of different aspects of the product (such as benefits, side effects, 
usage instructions for an allergy medicine) only when newness cues were given (Wood and 
Lynch 2002). This implies that while people do not process all aspects of INPs due to lower 
motivation, people may have a higher motivation to consider all aspects of RNPs (i.e. both 
feasibility and desirability issues), if the innovativeness of the product serves as a more 
salient newness cue.  
Consistently, past research differentiated between products with low vs. high 
complexity based on the extent of new knowledge required for effective usage (Alba and 
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Hutchinson 1987), and suggested that consumers assign different weights to the benefits and 
costs of the novel attributes for different types of products (Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001). 
When evaluating products with lower complexity, consumers rely more on the salient 
benefits (or desirability) while showing less interest in learning about actually using the 
product. However, for products with higher complexity, consumers naturally consider both 
the process of using the product and the product benefits (where the relative focus on 
feasibility or desirability directly impacts evaluation). This suggests that compared with 
lower-complexity INPs where consumers consider more outcome (or benefits) than process 
of using (or feasibility), the accessibility of the feasibility and desirability aspects does not 
differ as much for the higher-complexity RNPs. More formally, 
H1: While consumers naturally pay more attention to the desirability considerations 
than feasibility considerations for INPs, their natural focus on both consideration aspects are 
the same for RNPs.   
 
PROCESS- VERSUS OUTCOME-FOCUSED MENTAL SIMULATION 
In this section I review research on mental simulation and explore the effect of 
traditional process and outcome simulation on the evaluation of RNPs. Mental simulation is 
the imitative mental representation of events (Taylor and Schneider 1989). The role of mental 
simulation or mental imagery has been widely studied in various areas of psychology (Taylor 
et al. 1998) or in different marketing contexts (MacInnis and Price 1987; Shiv and Huber 
2000 etc.). However, not all types of mental simulation are equally effective. Research in 
psychology has identified two distinctive types of mental simulation: process simulation that 
is focused on the process of going through the steps of reaching a goal (i.e. the feasibility 
aspect) versus outcome simulation that is focused on the desirable outcome of achieving the 
goal (i.e. the desirability aspect).  
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The majority of the research has indicated that process simulation is more effective 
for goal attainment than outcome simulation (Taylor et al. 1998). For example, studies based 
on multiple-day tasks found that students achieved higher performance in their exams or 
class projects after process simulation than after outcome simulation (Pham and Taylor 1999; 
Rivkin and Taylor 1999; Taylor et al. 1998). In the context of the impact of advertising on 
incremental products (i.e. shampoo or vitamin), Escalas and Luce (2003, 2004) have shown 
that process focused advertisements increased behavioral intentions, especially when the 
arguments were strong. However, another study based on an imminent event found that 
outcome simulation led to higher-quality essays than process simulation (Taylor and Pham 
1999). Taylor and Pham (1999) conclude their work by stating that it is unclear what is 
responsible for these contradictory findings regarding the effect of process and outcome 
simulation. 
Recent work in the context of preference over time (Zhao, Hoeffler and Zaubermam 
2006) has examined the effect of mental simulation from a temporal perspective and 
demonstrated that each type of simulation is more effective when it augments the mental 
representation of an event that is naturally neglected. Process simulation is more effective for 
distant future events because it activates the naturally ignored feasibility considerations; 
whereas outcome simulation is more effective for near future events as it encourages the 
naturally ignored desirability considerations. This finding also offers a possible explanation 
to the seemly contradictory findings in the mental simulation literature mentioned above. 
Based on the complementary effect of mental simulation in terms of activating the 
naturally less accessible considerations, I believe that although process simulation (which 
enhances feasibility considerations for INPs) will be more effective than outcome simulation 
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to increase the evaluation of INPs, the same effect would not hold for RNPs. Since people’s 
natural mental representations between the desirability and feasibility related aspects for 
RNPs are not as different from each other as for INPs, the effect of the traditional process 
and outcome simulation in terms of enhancing product evaluation will not lead to differences 
in evaluation: 
H2: Process simulation increases the evaluation of INPs more than outcome simulation, 
whereas there is no advantage of the traditional process or outcome simulation over each 
other for RNPs.  
 
 
COGNITIVE VS AFFECTIVE PROCESSING MODE 
If there is no substantial difference between the traditional process and outcome 
simulation on the evaluation of RNPs, does this mean that mental simulation can not be 
employed to enhance to evaluation of RNP? In this section I discuss a possible confound in 
the traditional mental simulation literature and propose a factor that will evoke the unique 
effect of each type of simulation toward the goal of increasing the evaluation of RNPs, 
namely a cognitive vs. affective processing mode. In addition, I identify degree of planning 
and level of uncertainty as mediators of the unique effect of process and outcome simulation 
under each specific processing mode. 
Cognitive information processing is based on “cool,” slow and analytic thinking 
whereas affective information processing is based on “hot,” rapid and emotional feelings 
(Epstein 1994; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999). A large amount of research has examined the 
role of affective and cognitive focus and demonstrated that focusing on the cognitive vs. 
affective components leads to very different attitudes (Edell and Burke 1987), evaluations 
(Zauberman, Diehl and Ariely, forthcoming) and decisions (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004; 
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Metcalfe and Mischel 1999; Shiv and Nowlis 2004). A close look at the traditional mental 
simulation manipulations (Taylor et al. 1999; Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004) shows that to 
some degree, traditional process vs. outcome simulations are confounded with a cognitive vs. 
affective focus. In the psychology literature, process simulation often puts more emphasis on 
the cognitive components such as the step-by-step process of doing something, while 
outcome simulation usually focuses on the affective components such as feeling the joy of 
achieving something (Pham and Taylor 1999; Taylor et al. 1998).  
In the marketing literature, research (Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004) tries to incorporate 
both cognitive and affective components into the process and outcome simulation 
instructions. While this approach seems to balance and unconfound the effect of the cognitive 
and affective components of each type of simulation, those two components might interfere 
with each other when applied to RNPs. As past research has indicated, consumers have both 
the cognitive and affective uncertainty associated with RNPs (Hoeffler 2003; Castano et al. 
2006). In this co-existence of cognitive and affective responses, affective response (e.g. 
overall anxiety) would impact cognitive processing because affect could easily precede and 
bias cognitive thinking (Epstein 1994). On the other hand, cognitive information processing 
(e.g. trying to understand novel product information) might lead to negative affect because 
the process of processing product information induces affect (Garbarino and Edell 1997). As 
a result of this interference between cognitive and affective processing mode, the unique 
effect of each type of mental simulation might be blocked. Thus I attempt to tease apart the 
cognitive and affective processing focus and investigate the effect of process and outcome 
simulation on the evaluation of RNPs under each type of processing.  
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Cognitive Processing Mode:  
Existing mental simulation theory suggests that thinking about the process of using a 
product increases adoption intentions (e.g. Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004). However, given 
the nature of the high complexity of RNPs, it is difficult for consumers to understand how to 
use the features of a RNP (Hoeffler 2003). Consistently, numerous research has taken the 
cognitive perspective to investigate consumers’ learning mechanisms for novel products and 
indicated a negative effect of focusing on these unique product features. Earlier work showed 
that when people have low knowledge and little experience with a product, they can be 
overwhelmed by the detailed product features and thus spend little effort on the evaluation 
task (Bettman and Sujan 1987). Bettman and Sujan (1987) demonstrated that using an 
abstraction strategy and focusing on the end benefits associated with the product motivates 
more effort investment and increases the evaluation of those unfamiliar products. Similarly, 
recent research indicated that for products with higher complexity, focusing on the learning 
process associated with novel attributes evokes higher learning cost inferences and decreases 
evaluations of the product (Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001). However, switching the focus to the 
benefits and promoting value (benefit based) inferences increases product evaluation for 
novel attributes. Further, direct evidence in recent research on RNPs showed that it is 
difficult for consumers to picture the detailed cognitive process about how they would use 
the novel features of the RNP, leading to lower evaluations (Dahl and Hoeffler 2004).  
This prior research leads to the conclusion that for the evaluation of RNPs under a 
cognitive processing mode, outcome simulation (focused on the abstract desirability-related 
considerations) is more effective for enhancing the evaluation than process simulation (which 
is focused on the difficult feasibility-related) considerations.  
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Affective Processing Mode:  
Recent research on narrative self-referencing demonstrated that relying on narrative 
self-referencing stories when evaluating a product results in less critical analysis of the 
arguments, fewer negative thoughts and stronger affective responses, which in turn enhances 
attitude towards the product (Debevec and Romeo 1992; Green and Brock 2000; Escalas 
2004; West, Huber and Min 2004). As a broad definition of narrative self-referencing, it 
incorporates general knowledge about human goal-oriented action episodes that consist of a 
goal, action and an outcome (Pennington and Hastie 1986). As such, the content of narrative 
self-referencing is close to the content of process simulation which focuses on the steps of 
achieving a goal. 
The role of affective orientation was found to be central to narrative self-referencing. 
For example, research has shown that if a self-referencing task triggers analytical processing, 
people are sensitive to argument strength (Burnkrant and Unnava 1989, 1995). However, if 
the self-referencing task is affective oriented (i.e. narrative self-referencing), it leads to a 
strong reliance on affective processing mode and distracts attention from the specific product 
related facts (Sujan, Bettman and Baumgartner 1993). Specifically, self-referencing stories 
tend to evoke positive affect rather than negative affect due to “the immersion into a text” 
effect (Escalas 2004; West, Huber and Min 2004). Therefore, regardless of the characteristics 
of the product arguments (e.g. weak or strong), narrative self-referencing with an affective 
focus will increase positive affect, decrease sensitivity to argument quality, and increase 
evaluation (Escalas 2004). On the contrary, other research has shown that an ad emphasizing 
the focus on product benefits is not as effective as an ad emphasizing the focus on self-using 
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the product because product benefits are more abstract and result in less self-referencing and 
affective responses. The less positive impact on preference is due to the lack of immersion 
into the text and the related strong affective responses (Debevec and Romeo 1992).   
In sum, the findings above imply that affective-oriented process simulation leads to 
more narrative self-referencing. As one mentally immerses oneself into the process of the 
product usage, it evokes strong affective responses, switching attention away from the 
cognitive processing of the novel product features and reducing the negative cognitive 
construal of the product features, which ultimately leads to higher product evaluations. 
Affective-oriented outcome simulation (focusing on the end benefits of the product), 
however, is not sufficient to induce self-referencing due to its abstractness and is weaker in 
evoking affective responses, limiting its impact on product evaluation. This suggests that 
under an affective state, process simulation would lead to higher evaluation of the RNPs than 
outcome simulation. 
As such: 
H3: Under a cognitive focused processing mode, outcome simulation leads 
to higher product evaluations than process simulation; whereas under an 
affective focused processing mode, process simulation leads to higher 
product evaluations than outcome simulation. 
 
Degree of planning: What might mediate the effect of process and outcome simulation 
on the evaluation of RNPs? Classic research in mental simulation has shown that process 
simulation leads to higher degree of planning (i.e., how to study for an exam (Taylor et al. 
1998), or how to use a product (Escalas and Luce 2004)). This leads to higher performance or 
product adoption, respectively. This is consistent with the notion that after people develop 
high implementation intention, they are more successful in goal attainment (Gollwitzer 1999). 
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In the evaluation of RNPs, I also expect that the degree of planning plays a facilitating role in 
different combinations of simulation type and information processing mode. 
Under a cognitive information processing mode, as research on new product learning 
has indicated, people have little knowledge about the link between the product features and 
product benefits for RNPs (Hoeffler 2003), thus it is difficult for them to start from the 
complex product features and form a cognitive-oriented step-by-step plan about how to make 
use of those novel features of a RNP (e.g. Dahl and Hoeffler 2004. However, Park and Smith 
(1989) showed that when people were instructed to think about the benefits of the products, 
they not only based their product decision on the product benefits, but also used a top-down 
process and developed a great amount of thoughts about how to incorporate the products in 
specific product usage situations. This implies that under a cognitive processing mode, 
outcome simulation, which focuses on the cognitive benefits of the product, could lead to a 
higher degree of planning, or higher implementation intentions, in terms of how to use the 
product. 
On the contrary, when consumers have an affective focus, they form more narrative 
self-referencing under process simulation than outcome simulation. Two key elements of 
narrative self-referencing are: 1) it first organizes events in terms of a temporal dimension 
such as episodes of beginning, middle and end, and 2) it establishes causality between 
episodes such as goal, action and outcome (Bruner 1990). As such, the composition of those 
episodes appears just like a set of plans regarding how to take actions that lead to the final 
goal. Therefore, I argue that affective-focused process simulation leads to a higher degree of 
planning than outcome simulation. This is driven by the fact that process simulation causes 
more narrative self-referencing than outcome simulation.  
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H4: Under a cognitive focused processing mode, outcome simulation leads to a 
higher degree of planning than process simulation; whereas under an affective 
focused processing mode, process simulation leads to a higher degree of 
planning than outcome simulation. 
 
H5: Degree of planning mediates the effect of simulation type and information 
processing mode on product evaluation. 
 
Level of certainty: As people are able to develop a plan for using the product (i.e. 
forming implementation intentions) after specific type of mental simulation, I argue that this 
would reduce their level of uncertainty: 
H6: Under a cognitive focused processing mode, outcome simulation leads to a 
higher level of certainty than process simulation; whereas under an affective 
focused processing mode, process simulation leads to a higher level of certainty 
than outcome simulation. 
 
H7: Level of certainty mediates the effect of simulation type and information 
processing mode on product evaluation. 
 
 
A pilot study and two experiments were conducted to test the hypotheses. 
 
PILOT STUDY 
This pilot study is designed to uncover the default consideration level for products with 
different degrees of newness. In this study, I asked participants to list their thoughts about 
using the product and investigated whether people naturally think more about the process of 
using or the end benefits of the product for INPs and RNPs. 
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Method 
Sixty-nine students at a major southeastern university were recruited to complete a set 
of studies which include this study and were paid $5 as compensation. The study has a 2-
level single factor design (product newness: INP, RNP). 
Procedure, stimuli and measures 
 Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. 
Participants first read the product information, then they were asked to “describe what comes 
to your mind when you think about using this product.”  
Product stimuli. In the INP conditions participants were given a mock ad that 
included a picture of the latest version of the IBM ThinkPad. In the RNP conditions, the 
mock Ad included a picture of a product called an AudioPC. The picture of the AudioPC was 
taken from a product under development by Sony that has a vertical screen orientation with a 
smaller inlaid keyboard on the bottom of the product. The company logo was removed from 
each product and all brand identification information was eliminated (i.e., the product was 
called XI-100 in all conditions). Both product information sheets had 4 components: The 
headline, the picture and a short description underneath the picture, followed by a set of 
product features. The headline stated “The XI-100 is the mobile product for people on the 
go.” The short description underneath the picture paralleled the headlines “The XI-100 ultra-
portable notebook gives users outstanding performance in a small and light notebook.” 
Following the short description, each product included a list of eight features (four were 
common features and four were distinctive features; see Appendix D & E). Note that the 
same product stimuli for the RNP and INP are used in the later experiments.  
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A pretest was conduced to test the innovativeness of the ThinkPad (INP) and 
AudioPC (RNP) and the associated level of uncertainty. Ninety-five students at the same 
university viewed either the mock ad for ThinkPad or AudioPC and then answered three 
questions regarding the innovativeness of the product from 1 (not very innovative, not very 
novel, not very original) to 9 (very innovative, very novel, very original), as well as five 
questions regarding level of uncertainty with the usefulness of the product, benefit of the 
product, their ability to make use of the product, their ability to get the full use out of the 
product and their overall feeling of uncertainty, based on the same scale. The three newness 
measures were aggregated into an innovation index (α = .91) and the results showed that 
AudioPC (M = 5.67) was rated as significantly more innovative than ThinkPad (M = 4.37), 
F(1, 93) = 14.90, p < .001). Similarly, the five uncertainty measures were aggregated into an 
uncertainty index (α = .89) and the results showed that people had lower level of certainty 
with AudioPC (M = 5.44) than with ThinkPad (M = 6.34), F(1, 93) = 7.98, p < .01). 
 
Measures. After participants described their thoughts about the product, they 
proceeded to the questions. They answered three manipulation check questions regarding the 
innovativeness of the product from 1 (not very innovative, not very novel, not very original) 
to 9 (very innovative, very novel, very original). Subsequently they were asked to indicate 
the amount of visualization they used in this task. As the main measures of this study, they 
rated how much they thought about the process of using the XI-100 and how much they 
thought about the end benefits of using the XI-100. All scales were based on a 1 (not at all) to 
9 (a lot) point scale.  
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Results 
Manipulation check: The three product newness related questions were aggregated into 
an innovativeness index (α = .89). As anticipated, the AudioPC was rated as significantly 
more innovative than the ThinkPad (Ms = 5.78 vs. 4.76; F(1, 67) = 6.17, p < .05).  
Mental representations: Participants in both the INP (ThinkPad) and RNP (AudioPC) 
conditions used a similar amount of visualization (Ms = 5.24 vs 5.43, F(1, 67) = .14, p = .71). 
However, as expected, there was a marginally significant interaction between type of product 
and type of thoughts (F(1, 67) = 3.36, p = .07, ω2 = .299): When evaluating the INP, 
participants indicated that they had significantly more thoughts associated with the end 
benefits of the product (Ms = 6.12) than with the process of using the product (Ms = 5.32), 
F(1, 33) = 4.27, p < .05, ω2 = .234. Yet, when evaluating the RNP, participants indicated that 
they made similar number of thoughts about the end benefits (Ms = 6.40) and the process (Ms 
= 6.45) of using the product, F(1, 34) = .46, p = .83, which supported H1. See figure 3. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert figure 3 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Discussion 
The pilot study confirmed H1 and showed that people’s default mental representations 
(i.e. end benefits versus process of using the product) of the RNP differ from those of the 
INP. Specifically, participants naturally focused more on the end benefits than the process of 
using for the INP, their mental representation about the end benefits of using the product (or 
desirability) and the process of using the product (i.e. feasibility) did not differ for the RNP. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
The pilot study showed the natural level of construal of INPs and RNPs that are evoked. 
The purpose of experiment 1 is to manipulate the type of mental simulation to enhance the 
accessibility of different aspects of the products and examine its impact on the evaluation of 
both incremental and really new products.  
 
Method 
One hundred and thirty students at a major southeastern university were recruited to 
complete the experiment and were paid $5 as compensation. The experiment was a 2 
(product newness: INP, RNP) x 2 (simulation type: process focused, outcome focused) 
between-subjects design.  
 
Procedure, stimuli and measures 
 Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to different conditions. The 
experiment consisted of three stages: In the first stage, participants read the general 
instructions and examined the product information. Then they were instructed to practice 
mental simulation about the product for 2 minutes (which was timed). Afterwards they 
moved on to the dependent measures.  
Stimuli. The same product stimuli as in the pilot study were used. After participants 
read the product information, they were told to turn to the next page to read the simulation 
instructions and practice simulation. The manipulations of process and outcome simulation 
mirrored the language used in the prior mental simulation manipulations (Escalas and Luce 
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2004, p. 283). Detailed simulation instructions are presented in Appendix F. Participants 
were timed for 2 minutes to think about the product based on the specific instructions and 
write down their thoughts (to make sure that they did mental simulation before answering the 
questions). 
Measures. Participants were first asked to indicate their product evaluation and 
purchase interest. Multiple items were used to capture the evaluation and purchase intention. 
Participants answered four questions related with their evaluation of the XI-100 including 
overall evaluation; how they would rate the XI-100; whether they think the XI-100 is an 
excellent product; and their attitude towards the XI-100. As for measures of purchase interest, 
participants indicated how interested they would be in purchasing the XI-100; how seriously 
they would consider the XI-100; and what the likelihood is that they would buy the XI-100. 
Subsequently, they answered the 3-item manipulation check questions for product. As the 
manipulation check for type of mental simulation, participants indicated the content of their 
thoughts on a scale anchored at 1 (a lot about process) and 9 (a lot about end benefits).  
 
Results  
Manipulation checks: The three product newness related questions were aggregated 
into an innovativeness index (α = .93). As anticipated, the RNP (AudioPC) was rated as 
significantly more innovative than the INP (ThinkPad) (Ms = 6.26 vs. 4.68, F(1, 189) = 35.97, 
p < .001). Regarding the content of simulation, there was a significant main effect of 
simulation type: Participants in the process oriented conditions thought relatively more about 
the process of using the product whereas participants in the outcome oriented conditions 
thought relatively more about the end benefits of the product (Ms = 5.55 vs. 6.18, F(1, 126) = 
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3.74, p = .055). These results showed that product newness and focus of mental simulation 
were successfully manipulated. 
Product evaluation: A product evaluation index was created by aggregating the four 
evaluation related items (α = .93). A 2 (INP vs. RNP) x 2 (process vs. outcome simulation) 
ANOVA showed no main effect of product (F(1, 126) = 1.37, p = .24) or simulation (F(1, 
126) = .92, p = .34). As expected, there was a marginally significant interaction between 
product newness and simulation type (F(1, 126) = 3.15, p = .078, ω2 = .354). In terms of 
simple effects, process simulation was more effective in increasing product evaluation than 
outcome simulation (Ms = 6.95 vs. 6.37, F(1, 63) = 4.15, p < .05, ω2 = .242) for INPs. Finally, 
the difference between the effect of process simulation and outcome simulation for RNPs 
was not significant (Ms = 6.33 vs. 6.50, F(1, 63) = .30, p = .58). These results provide some 
support H2. See figure 4A. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert figure 4A about here 
----------------------------------- 
Purchase interest: Similarly, a purchase interest index was created based on the three 
purchase questions (α = .94). Again the results of a 2-way ANOVA showed no main effect of 
simulation (F(1, 126) = 1.41, p = .24), but a significant main effect of product (F(1, 126) = 
4.66, p < .05), which showed that participants had a stronger purchase interest towards the 
INP than the RNP. More importantly, there was a marginally significant interaction between 
product newness and simulation type (F(1, 126) = 3.23, p = .075, ω2 = .309): For the INP, 
process simulation was more effective in increasing purchase interest (Ms = 5.48) than 
outcome simulation (Ms = 4.48), F(1, 63) = 4.97, p < .05, ω2 = .201. However, for the RNP, 
purchase interest after process simulation (Ms = 4.16) was not different from purchase 
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interest after outcome simulation (Ms = 4.36), F(1, 63) = .17, p = .69, which provided 
additional support for H2. See figure 4B. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert figure 4B about here 
----------------------------------- 
Discussion 
These findings in experiment 1 confirmed H2 and indicated that process and outcome 
simulation impact the evaluation of RNPs differently from INPs. For an INP (which naturally 
evokes a desirability focus), process simulation which activates the feasibility related mental 
representations leads to higher product evaluation than outcome simulation (which 
redundantly encourages desirability focus). However, for RNP (where people naturally 
consider both desirability and feasibility), process and outcome simulation lead to similar 
product evaluations.  
The finding that process simulation is more effective than outcome simulation in 
increasing the evaluation of an INP is consistent with the classic findings where familiar 
products such as shampoo or vitamins were used (Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004). However, 
for the RNP which is the focus of this research, the results didn’t replicate prior research 
(process simulation to be better than outcome simulation). This finding seems to conflict with 
the findings in a recent study in the RNP domain (Castano et al. 2006) which used a virtual 
course as an example of RNPs and demonstrated that the adoption of the RNP will be 
strongest when the decision is for the near future and process simulation is encouraged.  
After carefully examining the mental simulation manipulations in this work, their 
instructions (Castano et al. 2006) differ a lot from the traditional simulation manipulations 
(e.g. Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004). While traditional simulation manipulations just globally 
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directs people’s attention to a basic aspect (i.e. process or outcome) of a product (Escalas and 
Luce 2003, 2004), Castano et al. (2006) uses paragraph-long detailed instructions with lots of 
examples about the process or the outcome of using the product. So, in a strict sense, 
participants did not simply receive process vs. outcome simulation instructions, they received 
helpful visualization aids to facilitate their simulation, which, not surprisingly, benefits the 
subsequent task (Dahl, Chattopadhyay and Gorn 1999). This is even more evident in the 
process simulation conditions, where people naturally had a lot difficulty when thinking 
about how they can use the RNPs (Hoeffler 2003; Dahl and Hoeffler 2004). 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that for RNPs, the effect of traditional process and outcome 
simulation were not different from each other in terms of product evaluation. As illustrated 
earlier in this essay, traditional process and outcome simulation are confounded within the 
type of processing mode (cognitive vs. affective). The simulation manipulations in 
experiment 1, which followed the classic manipulations in consumer research (Escalas and 
Luce 2003, 2004), purposely combined cognitive and affective focus within each type of 
simulation. In the conceptual framework of this essay, I theorized that each type of 
simulation should be more effective for the evaluation of RNPs under a different information 
processing mode. Thus, the purpose of experiment 2 is to tease apart the effect of cognitive 
vs. affective processing mode for each specific mental simulation type (process and outcome) 
and investigate whether/when each type of simulation will impact the evaluation of a RNP. 
To do so, the cognitive versus affective processing mode of process and outcome simulation 
is manipulated and their interactive effects on the evaluation of RNPs are examined. 
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Method 
One hundred and twenty-one students at a major southeastern university completed the 
experiment to fulfill research participation credit as part of an introductory marketing course. 
The experiment was a 2 (simulation type: process vs. outcome) x 2 (processing mode: 
cognitive vs. affective) between-subjects design based on the same RNP stimuli (AudioPC) 
used in experiment 1. 
Procedure and measures 
 Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. 
Participants received instructions about the specific ways in which they should examine the 
product before reviewing the product information. They were directed to either focus on the 
specific features or benefits of the product (cognitive conditions) or the specific emotions 
they may feel about the features or benefits of the product (affective conditions). Detailed 
instructions for the mental simulation are presented in Appendix G. After participants 
examined the ads with the product information, they had several lines to write down their 
thoughts/feelings. To strengthen our manipulation of the cognitive vs. affective focus, these 
lines were started with the words “I would think …” for cognitive focused conditions and “I 
would feel…” for affective focused conditions (Kivetz and Keinan 2006). After participants 
finished their writing, they proceeded to the questions at their own pace. 
Measures. The same multiple-item measures were used as in experiment 1 to capture 
the evaluation and purchase intention of the RNP. Degree of planning was captured by 
asking participants to what extent they have figured out exactly how they might use the XI-
100. Level of certainty was measured by asking participants to rate their certainty about the 
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usefulness of the XI-100. Lastly, participants were asked how much effort they put into this 
visualization exercise. All measures were based on 1 to 9 point scales. 
 
Results  
Product evaluation: The four evaluation related items were aggregated (α = .94) and a 
2–way ANOVA showed no main effect of simulation type (F(1, 117) = .81, p = .37) or 
processing mode (F(1, 117) = .15, p = .71), but an anticipated significant interaction between 
those two variables (F(1, 117) = 11.37, p < .001, ω2 = .088). Specially, under a cognitive 
processing mode, outcome simulation increased product evaluation significantly more than 
process simulation (Ms = 6.56 vs. 5.32, F(1, 58) = 9.04, p < .005, ω2 = .111). However, under 
an affective mode, process simulation was more effective than outcome simulation (Ms = 
6.19 vs. 5.47, F(1, 59) = 7.88, p = .084, ω2 = .325). These results provide support for H3; See 
figure 5A. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert figure 5A about here 
----------------------------------- 
Purchase interest: An index for purchase interest was created by aggregating the 
purchase interest related questions (α = .96). Similar to product evaluation, a 2 x 2 ANOVA 
showed no main effect of simulation type (F(1, 117) = .02, p = .88) or processing mode (F(1, 
117) = 1.71, p = .19), but an expected significant interaction between those two factors (F(1, 
117) = 14.36, p < .001, ω2 = .070). Specially, outcome simulation increased purchase 
intention significantly more than process simulation under a cognitive processing mode (Ms 
= 4.52 vs. 3.17, F(1, 58) = 7.48, p < .01, ω2 = .133), whereas process simulation was more 
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effective than outcome simulation under an affective mode (Ms = 4.02 vs. 2.77, F(1, 59) = 
6.87 p < .02, ω2 = .146). This provided further support for H3; See figure 5B. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert figure 5B about here 
----------------------------------- 
Degree of planning: A 2 x 2 ANOVA showed no main effect of simulation type (F(1, 
116) = .43, p = .51) or processing mode (F(1, 116) = .48, p = .49). As anticipated, there was a 
significant interaction between those two variables (F(1, 116) = 6.05, p < .02, ω2 = .165): 
Under a cognitive processing mode, outcome simulation increased degree of planning 
directionally more than process simulation (Ms = 5.43 vs. 4.73, F(1, 58) = 1.95, p = .17). 
However, under an affective mode, process simulation increased degree of planning 
significantly more than outcome simulation (Ms = 5.42 vs. 4.21, F(1, 58) = 4.17 p < .05, ω2 
= .240), providing some support for H4.  
Mediating role of degree of planning: The mediating role of degree of planning on 
product evaluation and purchase intention was tested (Baron and Kenney 1986). First, as 
indicated above, there was a significant interaction between the simulation type and 
processing mode on degree of planning. Second, degree of planning significantly predicted 
product evaluation (F(8, 111) = 6.43,  p < .001) and purchase interest (F(8, 111) = 6.36,  p 
< .001). Third, as described previously, simulation type and processing mode also interacted 
to predict product evaluation (F(1, 117) = 11.37, p < .001) and purchase interest (F(1, 117) = 
14.36, p < .001). Fourth, although the interactive effect of step 3 didn’t become non-
significant, it reduced its significance for both product evaluation (F(1, 115) = 5.18,  p < .05) 
and purchase intention (F(1, 115) = 8.21, p = .005) after degree of planning was added as a 
covariate. According to Baron and Kenney (1986), there exists a partial mediating role of 
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degree of planning for the interactive effect of simulation type and processing mode on 
product evaluation and purchase intention. In addition, Sobel tests showed that degree of 
planning was a significant mediator for the interactive effect between simulation type and 
processing mode for evaluation (t = 2.25, p < .05) and purchase interest (t = 2.17, p < .05), 
confirming H5. 
Level of certainty: A 2 x 2 ANOVA showed no main effect of simulation type (F(1, 116) 
= .72, p = .40) or processing mode (F(1, 116) = .28, p = .60), but a significant interaction 
between those two factors (F(1, 116) = 3.97, p < .05). Under a cognitive processing mode, 
outcome simulation only directionally increased level of certainty more than process 
simulation (Ms = 5.27 vs. 4.83, F(1, 58) = 7.3, p = .40), which provided limited support to 
H6. However, under an affective mode, process simulation increased level of certainty more 
than outcome simulation (Ms = 5.39 vs. 4.31, F(1, 59) = 3.66 p = .061). This provided 
support for H6.  
Mediating role of level of certainty: A series of tests were performed to examine the 
mediating role of certainty on product evaluation and purchase intention based on Baron and 
Kenney (1986). First, as indicated above, there was a significant interaction between the 
simulation type and processing mode on level of certainty. Second, level of certainty 
significantly predicted product evaluation (F(8, 111) = 3.62,  p = .001) and purchase interest 
(F(8, 111) = 4.40,  p < .001). Third, as described previously, simulation type and processing 
mode also interacted to predict product evaluation (F(1, 117) = 11.37, p < .001) and purchase 
interest (F(1, 117) = 14.36, p < .001). Fourth, although the interactive effect of step 3 didn’t 
become non-significant, it reduced its significance for both product evaluation (F(1, 115) = 
6.66 p < .05) and purchase intention (F(1, 115) = 9.62, p < .005) after level of certainty was 
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added as a covariate. According to Baron and Kenney (1986), when the first 3 steps are 
fulfilled whereas the last step is not fully met, I observe a partial mediation. Also, Sobel tests 
indicated that level of certainty was a marginally significant mediator for the interactive 
effect between simulation type and processing mode for evaluation (t = 1.83, p < .07) and 
purchase interest (t = 1.81, p = .07). These results suggested that level of certainty partially 
mediated the interactive effect of simulation type and processing mode on product evaluation 
and purchase intention, partially supporting H7. 
Effort: There was one more measure that was worth noting, namely the effort that 
participants spent on the visualization exercise. There was a significant interaction between 
simulation type and processing mode (F(1, 117) = 6.78, p < .01) on the spent on the exercise. 
Specially, when the processing mode was cognitive, participants spent much more effort on 
the task when they were asked to focus on the outcome of the RNP (M = 5.73) than on the 
process of using the product (M = 4.23), F(1, 58) = 10.46, p = .002. This is consistent with 
the notion that people are more willing to spend effort on the evaluation task if they are asked 
to focus on the end benefits compared with focus on the specific product features (Bettman 
and Park 1980; Bettman and Sujan 1987). When the processing mode is affective and 
cognitive effort is a less relevant factor, effort did not differ between outcome (M = 4.63) and 
process simulations (M = 4.94), F(1, 59) = .35, p = .56. 
 
Discussion  
Experiment 2 differentiated between cognitive and affective information processing 
mode to investigate the unique effect of each type of mental simulation on the evaluation of 
RNPs. Specially, under a cognitive processing mode, participants in the outcome simulation 
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indicated a higher product evaluation and purchase interest for the RNP compared with those 
in the process simulation conditions. However, under an affective processing mode, process 
simulation led to a higher product evaluation and purchase interest compared to outcome 
simulation. Further, the same pattern emerged for degree of planning about how to use the 
RNP and certainty with the RNP as the results showed that each factor was a partial mediator 
for the interactive effect of simulation type and processing mode. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this research, I identify a key characteristic of the RNPs related with the mental 
construal that is formed when consumers consider adopting the product, and propose ways to 
use process vs. outcome focused mental simulation to increase the evaluation of RNPs. I 
hypothesize and demonstrate in two experiments that the unique effectiveness of a specific 
type of simulation in augmenting evaluation will be elicited under a cognitive or affective 
information processing mode, respectively. 
 
Summary of Findings 
Taken together, the findings in essay 2 suggest that compared to INPs (where 
consumers tend to consider product benefits more than the process of using the product), 
RNPs evoke both the desirability related considerations about the end benefits of product and 
the feasibility related consideration about how to use the product. Based on the 
complementary role of mental simulation, there is only a minimal difference between the 
effect of traditional process and outcome simulation in terms of increasing product evaluation 
for RNPs.  
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However, I find that traditional process and outcome simulation are confounded with 
cognitive and affective information processing mode, and that each type of simulation has a 
unique effect under each specific processing mode. I demonstrate that under a cognitive 
information processing mode, outcome simulation is more effective at increasing the 
evaluation of RNPs than process simulation, because the product features are too novel and 
complex, consumers are better off using an abstraction strategy focusing on the end benefits 
of the product. On the contrary, under an affective information processing mode, process 
simulation is more effective at increasing the evaluation of RNPs than outcome simulation 
because affective focused process simulation leads to less critical thinking about the novel 
product information. Instead, more narrative self-referencing is driven (and thus a higher 
degree of planning about how to use the product result), which leads to higher certainty and 
higher evaluation for RNPs. However, affective-focused outcome simulation does not 
facilitate narrative self-referencing due to the abstractness of product benefits, thus limiting 
the spontaneous formation of plans about how to use the product. Finally, degree of planning 
and level of certainty each partially mediates the interactive effect of simulation type and 
information process mode. 
 
Contributions 
This research contributes to the new product literature by introducing another 
dimension of RNPs that differentiates them from INPs: mental construal of the product with 
a focus on high level desirability or low level feasibility. Existing research on RNPs has used 
degree of uncertainty or familiarity with the features and benefits as the key differences 
between RNPs and INPs and showed that people have higher uncertainty associated with 
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RNPs and are less familiar with the features and benefits for RNPs compared with INPs 
(Hoeffler 2003, Veryzer 1998). This work contributes to the new product learning literature 
by being the first to apply the distinction between desirability and feasibility-related mental 
construal in the really new product domain. At the same time, since construal level has been 
widely used in choice over time literature (e.g. Liberman and Trope 1998) and recently in 
research about psychological distance (for a review see Liberman, Trope and Stephan 2006), 
this research complements construal level theory by indicating that psychological distance is 
not the only factor that causes different construal levels. Degree of newness also leads to 
different mental construal of the products. 
This research also adds significantly to the mental simulation literature by examing the 
confounding effect between process vs. outcome simulation and the cognitive vs. affective 
focus. Past research either mixes process simulation with cognitive focus and outcome 
simulation with affective focus (Taylor et al. 1998), or places an equivalent emphasis on 
cognitive and affective focus within each type of simulation (Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004). I 
tease apart different information processing modes and indicate the unique effect of process 
vs. outcome simulation under each processing mode on the evaluation of RNPs.  
 
Limitation and Future Research 
I theorize that each type of mental simulation plays a complementary role and will be 
effective when each type activates the mental construal of the product that is naturally 
neglected. Further, I find that for the evaluation of RNPs, cognitive-focused outcome 
simulation enhances product evaluation more than cognitive-focused process simulation, 
whereas affective-focused process simulation is more effective than affective-focused 
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outcome simulation. While I identify degree of planning as an important mediator of this 
effect, it is still an interesting question as to whether people’s default mental construals for a 
RNP are cognitive-focused feasibility considerations and affective-focused desirability 
considerations. 
Another question that is worth further investigation is associated with affective process 
simulation. While affective process simulation leads to less cognitive information processing, 
yet a higher degree of planning, what is the role of memory? Past research on self-
referencing indicates that people have a worse recall of product features after narrative self-
referencing (Escalas 2004; Sujan, Bettman and Baumgartner 1993). In our experiment 2, 
participants weren’t asked to recall product features. Future research could test participants’ 
memory about product features and examine its relations to affective responses, degree of 
planning and product evaluation for RNPs. 
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CHAPTER 4 -- ESSAY 3 
VISUALIZATION AND NEW PRODUCT EVALUATION: 
THE ROLE OF MEMORY AND IMAGINATION-FOCUSED VISUALIZATION 
 
The Segway Human Transporter (HT) is a hydrogen-powered personal transportation 
device that mimics the human body's ability to maintain its balance and is designed for local 
transportation at a speed of up to 12.5 mph (Kemper 2003). Innovations like the Segway HT 
which represents technological groundbreaking departure from traditional transportation 
categories (i.e., car or bicycle) are often defined as really new products (RNPs), and allow 
consumers to do things that they have never been able to do before (Dahl and Hoeffler 2004; 
Hoeffler 2003; Lehman 1994; Moreau and Lehman 2001).  
To help consumers learn about the new benefits associated with RNPs, mental 
simulation of product usage has been identified as an effective cognitive tool (Dahl, 
Chattopadhyay and Gorn 1999; Dahl and Hoeffler 2004; Hoeffler 2003). For example, 
research has demonstrated how mentally simulating the usage of an RNP increases 
consumers’ ability to accurately predict the benefits of an RNP (Hoeffler 2003). However, 
due to the human nature of being “lazy organisms” or “cognitive misers” (Fiske and Taylor, 
1991; Bettman, Luce and Payne 1998), consumers are reluctant to engage in the extensive 
cognitive thinking that may be required. Consequently, in the new product domain, when 
asked to visualize new product-related activities, people underestimate the usefulness of the 
radically new features (Dahl et al. 1999; Dahl and Hoeffler 2004). Consumers base their 
mental images on their memories about past consumption routines which are more easily 
 
 
 
 
 
  
accessible. However, focusing on past consumption patterns may highlight the requisite 
behavior changes and thus enhance learning cost inferences (Murkejee and Hoyer 2001) 
associated with adopting a RNP. As a result, overall evaluations of a really new product are 
discounted (Dahl and Hoeffler 2004).  
If traditional visualization is both anchored by a reference to memories about past 
activities and truncated in order to preserve cognitive resources, perhaps refocusing the 
visualization on imaginative new uses could lead to enhanced evaluations. This idea is 
supported by evidence from the new product design domain where Dahl and colleagues 
(1999) found that when designing a product, using imagination-based visual imagery (e.g., 
going beyond previously seen images, visualizing new, never-before-experienced events) 
resulted in more original product designs than using visual imagery based on existing 
memories. In this research, I incorporate visual mental imagery with an imaginative focus 
into new product learning and examine the impact of the imaginative focus on the evaluation 
of RNPs. 
In the first experiment, the impact of traditional visualization (memory-focused) 
versus visualization with a focus on imagination (i.e., visualizing novel uses) was compared. 
After demonstrating the impact of imagination-focused visualization, I shift to understanding 
the process by which such visualization impacts evaluation. The key factor that I identify is 
the role of the ease/difficulty of the visualization exercise. In experiment 2, the difficulty of 
imagination focused visualization was manipulated by altering the accessibility of potential 
experiences to show how heightened difficulty of the visualization task reduces evaluation of 
an RNP. In experiment 3, I examine the role of providing visualization aids to demonstrate 
that enhanced ease of visualization leads to higher evaluations for RNPs. Finally, all 3 
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experiments demonstrate that while type of visualization impacts the evaluation of RNPs, it 
has a limited impact on more incrementally new products (INPs). 
 
VISUALIZATION AND REALLY NEW PRODUCT EVALUATION 
Really new products (RNPs) allow consumers to do some things that they have never 
been able to do before. As such, a variety of methods have been proposed to help consumers 
learn about the new benefits associated with RNPs. Research has proposed that providing 
relational analogies to existing products could be an effective method to help consumers 
learn (Gregan-Paxton and John 1997; Gregan-Paxton and Moreau 2003). In particular, 
Moreau and colleagues (Moreau, Lehmann, and Markman 2001; Moreau, Markman and 
Lehmann 2001) showed how analogies could be used to enhance the comprehension and 
acceptance of new products. Yet, as Roehm and Sternthal (2001) note, the lack of common 
attributes between RNPs and existing products makes it challenging to find appropriate 
products to use when providing analogies to consumers. Another method that has been 
employed to help consumers learn about the new benefits found in RNPs is mental 
simulation (or visualization) of product usage. 
Visualization is a form of cognitive processing where visual information is 
represented in working memory (MacInnis and Price 1987). Visualization enables the 
generation, interpretation, and manipulation of information through spatial representation. 
Visualization has been examined in a number of marketing contexts including advertising 
effectiveness (Edell and Staelin 1983), preference formation (Phillips, Olson, and 
Baumgartner 1995), attitude development (Kiselius and Sternthal 1984), anticipatory 
satisfaction with an experience (Shiv and Huber 2000; MacInnis and Price 1987), and the 
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aforementioned creativity in product design (Dahl et al.1999). The use of mental simulation 
as a cognitive tool to help consumers evaluate products is well established (Phillips 1996; 
Shiv and Huber 2000). As Walker and Olson (1997, pp 159) state, when consumers make 
product decisions they often form “visual images of certain product-related behaviors and 
their consequences.” Within the domain of RNPs, visualization has been used to enhance the 
accuracy of preference measurement (Hoeffler 2003) and to impact the evaluation of RNPs 
(Dahl and Hoeffler 2004).  
Prior work on measuring preferences for RNPs has demonstrated how visualizing 
using a RNP leads to more stable preferences (Hoeffler 2003). Yet, while mental simulation 
led to more stable preferences, research has also shown that it could lead to lower overall 
evaluations and lower adoption intentions (Hoeffler 2003; Dahl and Hoeffler 2004). As a 
possible explanation for these seemingly conflicting findings, I propose the following:  
Human beings are found to be “lazy organisms” or “cognitive misers” who naturally 
conserve their limited information processing resources. They use the most easily accessible 
or available information for their decisions and take shortcuts whenever they can (Bettman et 
al. 1998; Feldman and Lynch 1988; Fiske and Taylor 1991). As a consequence of these 
cognitive processing characteristics, errors and biases occur. Consistently, in the new product 
domain, when people are asked to think about the benefits/drawbacks of really new products 
(Hoeffler 2003) or to “picture themselves making use of the product” (Dahl and Hoeffler 
2004), they take the easier approach and limit their mental imagery to the most readily 
accessible consumption situations, namely the typical existing consumption scenario of 
existing products in their memory. While focusing on past usage might save initial cognitive 
effort, this memory-based focus could highlight the behavioral change required to fit the 
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RNP into past product usage patterns, and thus increase consumers’ inferences associated 
with potential learning costs (Murkejee and Hoyer 2001). This heightened focus on the 
potential learning costs requiring changes in behavior could consume valuable cognitive 
resources which hinders the ability of consumers to fully imagine the potential new benefits 
(Keller and Staelin 1987; Murkejee and Hoyer 2001). This, ultimately leads to a lower 
overall evaluations of a RNP. 
While traditional visualization focused on memory-based experience decreases the 
evaluation of RNP, I propose that refocusing visualization with an imaginative emphasis 
might enhance evaluations. Prior work has incorporated visual mental imagery into product 
design by explicitly comparing the effect of memory-based and imagination-based 
visualization, and has found advantages for imagery that was based on the designer’s 
imaginations (Dahl et al. 1999). In that research, participants were asked to “use past 
memories to form visual images of potential (product) designs” in the memory visualization 
condition and “use imagination to form visual images of potential (product) designs” in the 
imagination visualization conditions (Dahl et al. 1999; p. 22). In addition, participants in a 
third condition were asked to use a spontaneous visualization process with neither a memory 
nor an imagination focus. This work showed that when people were asked to form 
spontaneous mental images, their imagery was primarily memory-based, which supports our 
view that consumers are unwilling to engage in extensive cognitive processing unless they 
are pushed to do so. More importantly, this research found that imagination focused visual 
imagery led to more useful and original new product designs (when designers also 
incorporated the customer into their visualization exercise) than visual imagery with a 
memory based focus (or spontaneous visualization). These findings suggest that changing the 
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focus of visualization from simply using the product to encouraging the imaginative new 
usage of the product will enhance consumer evaluations of a RNP.  
 The impact of specific types of visualization on the evaluation of really new products 
is our primary focus in this research, yet I would also like to demonstrate a boundary 
condition of these effects when applied to INPs. As such, a comparison between RNPs and 
their more incremental counterparts is important. One of the fundamental differences 
between RNPs and INPs that is noteworthy in this context is the higher amount of learning 
costs associated with RNPs compared with an incremental product (Hoffler 2003; Murkejee 
and Hoyer 2001). For an INP with a lower level of complexity, when consumers focus on 
existing consumption patterns, less behavior changes are required and lower learning costs 
are involved (Murkejee and Hoyer 2001). This implies that consumers will have the mental 
resources to estimate the value of new capabilities of the INP, which they would naturally do 
when they focus on the potential new uses of the product. Therefore, switching the focus of 
visualization from existing usage situations to new usage situations will not have as large of 
an impact on evaluations of an INP.  
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Imaginative-focused visualization will lead to higher evaluations of a RNP 
than memory-focused visualization, whereas focus of the visualization exercise 
(memory vs. imagination) will not have an impact on the evaluation of an INP.  
 
EXPERIMENT 1: FOCUS OF VISUALIZING 
Experiment 1 manipulates the focus of a visualization task and examines the impact on 
the evaluation of both incremental and really new products. Participants were asked to either 
freely visualize a new product or imagine completely new types of activities. In addition, 
difficulty or ease associated with each type of visualization was measured. 
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Method 
One hundred and fifty-nine students at a major southeastern university were recruited to 
complete the experiment and were paid $5 as compensation. The experiment was a 2 
(product newness: INP, RNP) x 2 (visualization: memory-based visualization, visualization 
with a focus on imaginative usage) between-subjects design. 
Procedure, stimuli and measures 
 Procedure. The experiment was conducted block-wise with memory-based 
visualization and imagination focused visualization run in separate blocks. Participants were 
randomly assigned to either the INP or the RNP in each visualization block. The experiment 
consisted of three stages: In the first stage, participants were given 2 minutes to read the 
general instructions and examine the product information. Then they were instructed to 
visualize using the product before proceeding to the dependent measures. 
Product stimuli. The same stimuli for INP and RNP as in essay 2 were used (see 
appendix D and E). 
Visualization. After participants read the product information, they were told to turn 
to the next page to read the visualization instructions. In the memory-based visualization 
conditions, participants read the following instruction: 
When thinking about whether to buy new products, many consumers 
find that using visualization to form visual images (pictures in the 
mind) of the uses of the product can help them evaluate it.  
 
Visualizing activities with the XI-100, may help you evaluate the XI-
100. Please free your mind to visualize these activities (i.e. think 
about ways you will use computers) as you evaluate the XI-100. 
 
In the imagination focused visualization conditions, participants read the following 
instruction: 
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When thinking about whether to buy new products, many consumers 
find that using imagination to form visual images (pictures in the 
mind) of potential uses of the product can help them evaluate it.  
 
Unleashing your imagination and visualizing new activities that you 
have never been able to do with computers before, may help you 
evaluate the XI-100. Please push yourself to visualize these new 
activities (i.e. think about new ways you will use computers) as you 
evaluate the XI-100. 
 
After all participants read the instructions, the experimenter orally repeated the last 
sentence of each manipulation instruction, respectively, and asked participants to close their 
eyes and visualize/imagine using the product for 2 minutes before moving on to the 
dependent measures. Participants’ visualization was timed by the experimenter. 
Measures. Multiple items were used to capture the overall evaluation of the product 
and also to perform the requisite manipulation checks. Participants were asked to indicate 
their overall evaluation of the XI-100 and how they would rate the XI-100 based on a 1 (bad, 
poor) to 9 (good, excellent) point scale. As manipulation checks for the level of the product’s 
newness, participants rated the innovativeness of the XI-100 from 1 (not very innovative, not 
very novel, not very original) to 9 (very innovative, very novel, very original). Subsequently, 
they were asked to indicate the amount of visualization they used to help their evaluation 
based on a 1 (very little visualization) to 9 (lots of visualization) point scale and rate the type 
of activities that they envisioned in the visualization exercise, anchoring from 1 (mostly past 
activities) to 9 (mostly new activities). The former measure (i.e. amount of visualization) will 
be used as a covariate in the succeeding analysis for product evaluation. Participants then 
indicated how easy or difficult they found the visualization task based on a similar 1 to 9 
point scale. Finally, participants described the mental pictures that they had during the 
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visualization task. Note that some of these mental pictures (particular activities) were used in 
a later experiment as aids to the visualization task.  
 
Results  
Manipulation checks: The three product newness related questions were aggregated 
into an innovativeness index (α = .92). As anticipated, the AudioPC was rated as significantly 
more innovative than the ThinkPad (Ms = 6.23 vs. 4.75, F(1, 155) = 26.83, p < .001, ω2 
= .037). Regarding type of visualization (i.e. memories vs. new activities), there was a 
significant main effect of visualization type: People in the imagination conditions envisioned 
new activities significantly more than people in the memory-based visualization conditions 
who naturally accessed more past activities (Ms = 5.06 vs. 3.50, F(1, 155) = 23.89, p < .001, 
ω2 = .042). This was consistent with the expectations that when simply asked to visualize 
using the product, people generally take the less mentally exhaustive approach of limiting the 
imagination of completely new uses. 
Product evaluation. The two product evaluation questions were aggregated into an 
evaluation measure (α = .92). A 2x2 ANOVA was conducted controlling for amount of 
visualization and there was no main effect of product (F(1,154) = .65, p =.42) or 
visualization strategy (F(1,154) = .60,  p =.44). As predicted, there was a significant 
interaction between product and visualization strategy (F(1,154) = 4.29,  p < .05, ω2 = .233): 
Imagination focused visualization increased the evaluation of RNP (AudioPC) compared 
with free visualization (Ms = 6.91 vs. 6.21, F(1,75) = 5.62, p < .005, ω2 = .178). However, 
there was no difference between the two types of visualization strategy on the evaluation for 
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the INP (ThinkPad) (Ms = 6.29 vs. 6.45, F(1,80) = .22, p = .64; see figure 6), providing 
support for H1.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert figure 6 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Mediating role of ease of visualization. A series of tests was performed to examine the 
mediating role of ease of visualization based on Baron and Kenney (1986). First, a two-way 
ANOVA, in which ease of visualization was the dependent variable, revealed an interaction 
between the product and visualization as the two independent measures (F(1, 153) = 4.00, p 
< .05, ω2 = .250). Second, ease of visualization significantly predicted product evaluation 
(F(8, 148) = 3.12,  p < .005, ω2 = .320). Third, as described previously, the two independent 
factors also interacted to predict product evaluation. Fourth, when I added ease of 
visualization to this model as a covariate, the interactive effect of the independent factors 
became non-significant (F(1, 152) = 2.24, p = .14). This set of analysis suggested that ease of 
visualization mediated the interactive effect of product and visualization type on product 
evaluation. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that compared with visualization which was memory-
focused, imagination-based mental imagery increased the evaluation of RNP, but had no 
impact on the evaluation of an INP. This is, for the RNP, encouraging people to focus on the 
new uses of the product increased evaluations. However, for the INP, focusing on the new 
uses did not impact the evaluation of the product. When asked to employ an imagination-
focused visualization, people envision more new usages of the product and are willing to 
 
78 
 
 
 
  
engage in more extensive visualization. However, when asked to just freely visualize using 
the product, people rely on the more readily available past activities and are less willing to 
expand the cognitive effort necessary to fully appreciate the product. This highlights the 
importance of the amount of effort associated with the visualization task which will be the 
focus of the remainder of this paper.   
 
EASE OF THE VISUALIZATION TASK 
Beyond the main findings, experiment 1 hints that ease of visualization could impact 
product evaluation. Indeed, there is a large amount of research in psychology and marketing 
that examines the role of ease of information processing (Anand-Keller and McGill 1994; 
Garbarino and Edell 1997; Sanna and Schwarz 2004; Sherman et al 2002; Schwarz 1998, 
2004; Schwarz et al. 1991; Waenke, Bohner and Jurkowitsch 1997). Garbarino and Edell 
(1997) find that alternatives requiring more cognitive effort to evaluate led the decision 
maker to choose that alternative less frequently than an alternative requiring less effort to 
evaluate. Recent research on the accessibility of experiences hints at the potential for the 
difficulty of the visualization exercise to impact evaluations. Notably, Schwarz (1998, 2004) 
and colleagues (Sanna and Schwarz 2004) found that people rely more on the accessibility of 
experiences (i.e., ease of retrieval) than the accessible content. For example, subjects who 
recalled only four childhood events felt that they remembered their childhood better than 
subjects who were asked to recall 12 events (Schwarz 1998). Further evidence for the impact 
of accessibility was found in the marketing context by Waenke, Bohner and Jurkowitsch 
(1997), who demonstrated that having to name 10 reasons for choosing a focal car led to 
lower evaluations than having to name only one reason, primarily due to the ease of retrieval. 
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 Prior work on visualization with both incremental and really new products has 
demonstrated that the difficulty of the visualization task can mediate the impact on 
evaluation (Dahl and Hoeffler 2005). Dahl and Hoeffler (2005) found that visualizing others 
using the new product was easier for RNPs than self-visualization, and that higher perceived 
visualization ease led to higher evaluations for the product. At the same time, research has 
identified another key difference between evaluating a RNP and an INP, namely the amount 
of preference construction that is thought to occur when evaluating the product (Bettman et al. 
1998). For incremental products, where participants have some experience in the domain, 
preferences will be less susceptible to the subtle context effects (such as experienced ease 
during the visualization exercise). In particular, recent research has shown that level of 
knowledge can influence the perception of how diagnostic retrieval ease is likely to be 
(Tybout et al. 2005). For example, when people were asked to generate thoughts about a 
focal car, people to whom the features were more familiar relied more on the retrieval 
content, whereas people who had lower familiarity with the product and found it more 
difficult to process the product information, relied more on the retrieval ease. This leads to 
the following prediction: 
H3: Perceived ease of the visualization task will impact the effect of visualization on 
the evaluation of an RNP but have no impact on the evaluation of an INP. 
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Experiments 2 and 3 proceed to investigate the question of how ease of visualization 
impacts the efficacy of the visualization task to enhance evaluation. To do so I focus 
exclusively on imagination-based visualization as this was found to be the effective strategy 
(in experiment 1) that impacted the evaluation of the RNP. In the following experiments I 
move from measuring ease of visualization (and identifying it as a mediator) to manipulating 
difficulty (experiment 2) and ease of visualization (experiment 3) directly.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2: MAKING IMAGINATION MORE DIFFICULT 
Our manipulation of ease of imagination in experiment 2 followed the previous 
approaches (Schwarz 1998; Waenke, Bohner and Jurkowitsch 1997) by asking people to 
imagine one (versus eight) new activities for a new product. It is expected that imagining one 
example will be easier whereas imagining eight examples will be more difficult. I predict that 
the ease of imagining these activities, in turn, will have a larger impact on the product 
evaluation of an RNP than on an INP. 
 
Method 
Eighty-four students were recruited at the same university to complete the experiment 
and were paid $5 as compensation. The experiment was a 2 (product newness: INP, RNP) x 2 
(difficulty of imagination visualization: producing 1 activity, producing 8 activities) 
between-subjects design. 
Procedure, stimuli and measures 
Procedure. A similar procedure was employed as in Experiment 1 with a slight 
difference. After participants examined the product information in stage 1 and imagined 
using the product in stage 2, they were asked to describe the activities they had envisioned 
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for 2 minutes to make sure that they did the visualization before they answered the questions. 
Participants were timed for 2 minutes while they described their mental images. Note that in 
experiment 1 where free visualization and imaginative visualization were compared, I asked 
participants to describe their thoughts after they finished answering all the questions to avoid 
any impact on the evaluations. However, in experiment 2 (and also 3), describing the 
thoughts is an essential part of the manipulation of ease of visualization because the 
perception of ease would be more accurate if participants are forced to spell out the activities. 
Therefore, they described their thoughts before they proceeded to the questions. 
Manipulations. The same mock ads as experiment 1 were used as a manipulation of 
product newness (INP and RNP). The imagination instructions were similar to those in the 
imagination conditions in experiment 1, with the additional information that asked 
participants to envision either one or eight new activities that they had never been able to do 
with computers before, but will be able to do with the XI-100. 
 Measures: After participants were instructed to perform the imagination exercise and 
describe their mental pictures, they answered a set of questions which were similar to 
experiment 1 and included the two product evaluation measures as the main DVs, three 
product newness related question as manipulation checks for product newness, a question 
regarding how easy/difficult they found the visualization exercise to be, and a question about 
the amount of visualization. As in experiment 1, amount of visualization was used as a 
covariate. 
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Results 
Manipulation checks: As in experiment 1, the product newness related questions were 
aggregated into an innovativeness index (α = .90). The results showed that the AudioPC was 
rated as marginally more innovative than the ThinkPad (Ms = 5.73 vs. 5.04, (F(1,80) = 3.39, 
p < .07, ω2 = .298). In terms of ease of imagination, thinking of eight new activities was 
perceived to be more difficult than thinking of 1 example (Ms = 5.32 vs. 3.84, F(1,80) = 
11.45, p < .001, ω2 = .087). 
Product evaluation. The two product evaluation related questions were aggregated into 
an overall evaluation measure (α = .95). There was a significant interaction between product 
and visualization strategy on the evaluation measure, (F(1,79) = 4.22, p < .05, ω2 = .237), but 
there was no main effect of product (F(1,79) = 2.03, p = .16) or number of examples required 
(F(1,79) = 2.03, p = .16). When imagination of new uses was easier (i.e., imagining only 1 
new activity) for the RNP (AudioPC), participants increased their evaluation compared with 
when the imagination of new uses was difficult (i.e., imagining 8 new activities) (Ms = 6.90 
vs. 5.83, F(1,41) = 4.68, p < .05, ω2 = .214). However, there was no difference in evaluation 
when thinking of 1 vs. 8 new activities for the INP (ThinkPad) (Ms = 6.71 vs. 6.90, F(1,39) 
= .20, p = .66 ; See figure 7). These results provided support for H3. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert figure 7 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Cognitive responses: To get some insight into the impact of the manipulation on the 
actual thoughts used in visualization, I had the written protocol analyzed to determine the 
number of thoughts that were accessed. If participants were able to successfully visualize 
more activities, then the impact of the difficulty of the visualization exercise might be 
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attenuated. Indeed, this did occur, but only for the incrementally new product, as illustrated 
by the analyses below. 
 Two independent coders who were blind to the hypotheses were asked to count the 
number of thoughts that were related with the product features provided for each participant. 
The inter-coder reliability was .94. A 2x2 ANOVA indicated a marginally significant effect 
of product (F(1,80) = 2.98, p < .10, ω2 = .335), number of thoughts required to produce 
(F(1,80) = 3.24, p < .10, ω2 = .309 ) and interaction between those two factors (F(1,80) = 
2.77, p < .10, ω2 = .361). In particular, participants were able to generate significantly more 
thoughts related with the INP in the 8-example conditions than in the 1-example condition 
(Ms = 3.15 vs. 1.98, F(1,39) = 4.50, p < .05, ω2 = .223), but they generated similar amount of 
thoughts related with the RNP in both the 8- and 1-example condition (Ms = 2 vs. 1.95, 
F(1,41) = .013, p = .91).  
Considering the fact that for both products, participants perceived it to be more difficult 
to produce 8 examples than 1 example, these coding results implied that for the RNP, people 
did rely on retrieval ease rather than retrieval content since they lowered their evaluation in 
the 8-example condition (even though the retrieval content was similar in both visualization 
conditions). On the contrary, for the INP, people appeared to rely more on the retrieval 
content since they did not lower their evaluation for the INP in the 8-example condition even 
though it was more difficult. This is consistent with the findings of Tybout et al. (2005) 
regarding the moderating role of product knowledge on the effect of experienced ease. 
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Discussion 
The results of experiment 2 indicate that when thinking of new uses for new products, 
the ease/difficulty of visualization matters when the product is really new, but does not when 
the product is only incrementally new. Specifically, for the RNP, envisioning 8 new activities 
was perceived to be more difficult, leading to a decreased evaluation compared to thinking of 
only 1 new activity. For the INP, imagining 8 activities was also perceived to be more 
difficult than thinking of 1 activity, but it did not impact the evaluation of the product.  
 
EXPERIMENT 3: MAKING IMAGINATION EASIER 
Experiment 2 showed that when asked to visualize eight new activities, participants 
lowered their evaluation of a RNP due to the difficulty of visualization. How could the 
product evaluation be enhanced? An intuitive answer would be to make the visualization 
easier. In the consumer learning literature, Dahl et al. (1999) demonstrated that providing 
people with visualization trainings helps product design. Moreover, research in product 
design has shown that when people are given an external example for product design, this 
external example activates a mental representation of the product which may prevent the 
construction of other representations of the product (Dahl and Moreau 2002; Finke, Ward 
and Smith 1992). Thus I expect that giving people one example would not make the 
visualization task any easier, whereas giving people abundant examples should increase the 
ease and thus serve as aids for consumer’s visualization of new usages. The manipulation of 
ease of imagination in experiment 3 followed this notion by giving participants different 
amount of activities that they could refer to when they imagine the new uses of a product. I 
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predict that receiving more examples of activities will make the imaginative visualization 
easier, leading to higher evaluations of the RNP. 
Method 
Eighty-three students at the same southeastern university were recruited to complete the 
experiment and were paid $5 as compensation. The experiment was a 2 (product newness: 
INP, RNP) x 2 (number of visualization aids: 1 activity, 8 activities) between-subjects design. 
Procedure. The procedure of experiment 3 was the same as experiment 2 except for the 
imagination instructions. Instead of asking participants to envision either one or eight 
activities, participants were provided with a list of one or eight activities as an aid for their 
visualization. The activities were taken from the written protocols of participants in 
experiment 1, based on the frequency of being mentioned.  
In the 1 example conditions, participants were given the following example: 
• Taking notes in class that you can paste directly into handouts (e.g., Powerpoint) 
 
In the 8 examples condition, participants were given the following examples: 
 
• Carrying the lightweight computer with you all over campus 
• Taking notes in class that you can paste directly into handouts (e.g., Powerpoint) 
• Bringing to a sporting event to capture and dictate audio and writing a blog of what is 
happening. 
• Writing directly on PDF and reading my notes on the handouts 
• Typing and working in the dark with lighted keyboard 
• Audio recording a professors lecture and replaying portions of the lecture when 
reviewing and studying for test 
• Watching an entire movie on a plane without the battery dying  
• Signing electronic documents and transfer with computer signature 
 
Results 
Manipulation checks: The three product newness related questions were aggregated 
into an innovativeness index (α = .93). As anticipated, the AudioPC was rated as significantly 
more innovative than the ThinkPad (Ms = 6.07 vs. 4.94, F(1,79) = 8.41, p < .005, ω2 = .119). 
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Regarding ease of imagination, imagination after receiving 8 examples was perceived to be 
less difficult than imagination after receiving only 1 example (Ms = 4.26 vs. 5.02, F(1,79) = 
2.79, p < .10, ω2 = .358).  
Product evaluation. Again, the two product evaluation related questions were 
aggregated into an evaluation measure (α = .95) and amount of visualization was used as a 
covariate. The ANOVA indicated a non-significant main effect of product (F(1, 78) = .09, p 
= .76). However, there was a significant effect for the number of examples given (one or 
eight) (F(1, 78) = 9.24, p < .005, ω2 = .108). This main effect was driven primarily by the 
RNP (AudioPC), as indicated by the significant interaction between product and visualization 
strategy (F(1, 78) = 5.99, p < .05, ω2 = .168): For the AudioPC, evaluation after receiving 8 
examples increased significantly compared with the condition where only 1 example was 
given (Ms = 7.47 vs. 5.55, F(1,39) = 18.91 p < .001, ω2 = .053). Conversely, for the 
ThinkPad, there was no significant impact associated with receiving 8 examples versus 
receiving 1 example (Ms = 6.53 vs. 6.20, F(1,40) = .40, p = .53; See figure 8). Again, this 
provided support for H3. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert figure 8 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Cognitive responses: To investigate the impact of different amount of examples on the 
actual number and type of participants’ thoughts, I asked two independent coders who were 
blind to the hypotheses to code the written protocol based on whether the thoughts were 
related with the product features described on the ad or the example activities that 
participants received. The overall inter-coder reliability was .80.  
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As a result, I found that when only given one example, people tended to focus on the 
product features and produced a greater number of thoughts based on the features than 
participants receiving 8 examples (Ms = 1.97 vs. 1.19, F(1, 76) = 11.01, p = .001). In 
addition, participants who were given one example envisioned fewer thoughts related with 
examples given compared with people receiving 8 examples (Ms = .44 vs. 1.31, F(1, 76) = 
43.55, p < .001). More interestingly, in terms of the total number of thoughts, our coding 
results showed that participants envisioned more thoughts when receiving 1 example than 
when receiving 8 examples (Ms = 2.47 vs. 1.97, F(1, 76) = 4.93, p < .05), which was rather 
driven by the RNP: There was a marginally significant difference for the overall number of 
actual thoughts between the 1 vs. 8 example conditions for RNP (Ms = 2.69 vs. 2.16, F(1, 37) 
= 3.05, p < .09), but not for INP (Ms = 2.25 vs. 1.79, F(1, 39) = 2.01, p = .17). Given that 
participants were able to envision more activities after receiving 1 example than receiving 8 
examples for the RNP, and that they indicated a lower evaluation towards the RNP in the 1 
example condition, I conclude that it was not the content of the thoughts, but the perceived 
ease of creating thoughts, that impacted the evaluation of the RNP. However, for the INP, 
content of thoughts seemed to influence product evaluation as its pattern matched the 
evaluation pattern. 
 
Discussion 
Overall, experiment 3 mirrored and extended the results of experiment 2 and indicated 
that when imagining new uses of new products, ease of imagination plays a role for the RNP, 
but not for the INP. Specifically, for the RNP, having 8 examples as an aid for the 
visualization makes visualization easier and it increases the overall evaluation (as compared 
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to only having one example). Interestingly, I also found that receiving more examples 
actually constrained people’s imagination so that their thoughts were mostly about the 
examples given and the overall number of thoughts that they could come up with was lower 
than those people who were only provided with 1 example. However, the actual number or 
type of thoughts did not impact evaluation. Rather, it was the perceived ease of mentally 
creating new activities that directly impacted evaluation. Finally, when a product was 
incrementally new, the number of examples given did not impact ease of evaluation or 
product evaluations.  
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this essay I examined the impact of specific types of visualization on the evaluation 
of RNPs. I compared the traditional memory-focused visualization with a new type of 
visualization focused on the imaginative aspects of a RNP. In experiment 1, I demonstrated 
that the focus of the visualization task (i.e. focus on past product actives or imaginative new 
use) has an important impact on the evaluation of an RNP and no impact on the evaluation of 
a more incrementally new product. Specifically, visualizing the imaginative new uses that are 
enabled by a RNP leads to a higher evaluation. In addition, perceived ease of visualization 
mediated the impact on evaluation – leading to the manipulation of difficulty and ease in the 
following experiments. In experiment 2, difficulty of imagination was manipulated by 
prompting subjects to come up with 1 or 8 new activities that they could perform with the 
new product. This manipulation had the predicted effect for the RNP (lowering the 
evaluation of the product when 8 activities were required) and no effect on the incremental 
product. In experiment 3, I took the exact opposite approach and manipulated ease of 
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imagination by providing participants with 1 or 8 activities related with the new product. The 
results show that providing visualizations aids had a large impact on the evaluation of the 
RNP and no impact on the evaluation of the incremental product. Specifically, participants 
who were given 8 examples had a higher evaluation of the RNP than participants who were 
given only one example due to the higher perceived ease. 
The results of essay 3 add significantly to recent research on mental simulation and 
new product learning by identifying different types of visualization focus. Past research 
studying the effect of mental simulation has indicated a positive role of visualization in terms 
of product evaluation for incrementally new products or services (e.g. Phillips 1996; Shiv 
and Huber 2000), yet a negative effect of visualization on product evaluation for RNPs (Dahl 
and Hoeffler 2004). I proposed an explanation for these seemingly conflicting findings by 
showing that due to the human nature as a cognitive miser, people’s default visualization is 
based on past product usages which are more easily accessible in their mind. As prior 
visualization instructed people to simply think about product usage instead of prompting 
people to imagine innovative new uses, people tended to preserve their cognitive resources 
and focus their visualization only on the most readily available images from the past product 
usage scenario. I conjecture that when applied to RNP, the attempt to fit a RNP into existing 
product usage frame evokes higher perceived learning costs and leads to a discounting of a 
product. I introduced the concept of imaginative new usage focus into this literature and 
showed that only if explicitly instructed to rely on imaginative new uses will visualization 
enhance product evaluations of a RNP.  
Essay 3 also contributes to the accessibility literature by demonstrating the role of 
ease of imagination. Existing research on the impact of ease were mostly based on ease of 
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recalling events from past memories (Schwarz et al. 1991; Schwarz 1998), or retrieving 
reasons of using a product (Tybout et al. 2005; Wanke, Bohner and Jurkowitsch 1997). 
Different from these retrospective perspectives, I took an anticipatory angle and manipulated 
ease of creating new activities in the domain of new product learning. The results showed 
that ease of creation had a similar pattern to ease of retrieval in terms of product evaluation 
of a RNP, but a differential pattern on the evaluation of an INP. To our knowledge, this is the 
first piece of work in the literature on accessibility that directly tests the differentiated role of 
ease of creation on learning and evaluation of a RNP and INP. 
Multiple future research directions were suggested. One of the limitations of this 
work is that the same product category was used throughout the 3 experiments. More 
empirical studies are needed to test the robustness of the findings with other new product 
categories. An interesting question that remains is how would affect impact evaluations? Do 
people enjoy imaginative-focus visualization more than memory-focused visualization? In 
particular, when people receive more examples about the product usage as visualization aids, 
do they have more positive affective responses? Research on narrative self-referencing 
showed that when consumers put them themselves into specific situations where they interact 
with a product, positive affect will be increased and they pay less attention to the cognitive 
content of their information processing, which ultimately leads to higher product evaluation 
(Escalas 2004; West, Huber and Min 2004). How does this affective focus relative to the 
argument focus relate to people’s reliance on perceived ease over the content of imagination? 
In addition, one could examine the role of different visualization focus (i.e. past uses vs. 
imaginative new uses) on the learning of hybrid products which consist of two or more 
product categories with different familiarity levels (Gregan-Paxton, Hoeffler and Zhao 2005). 
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Will consumers rely more on the familiar category under traditional visualization to save 
cognitive effort? Would people rely on both the high and low familiarity categories under 
imaginative focused visualization?  
 
Managerial implications 
The results of prior research provide caution to managers who are trying to introduce 
new products into the marketplace. First, the use of analogies to help consumers learn about 
RNPs has met with limited success with consumers who have the most experience in the 
domain (Moreau, Lehmann, Markman 2001). Second, the inclusion of novel features has 
been shown to provoke learning cost inferences (Murkejee and Hoyer 2001). Third, studies 
on the effects of visualizing the use of RNPs have consistently found that visualizing how the 
product fits with existing usage patterns lowers consumer evaluations of the product 
(Hoeffler 2003, Dahl and Hoeffler 2004). Yet, this research points to a direction that 
managers could use visualization to help consumer learn about the novel benefits provided 
by RNPs without adversely impacting evaluations.  
The findings in this essay suggest that when marketing RNPs, marketers should 
encourage customers to focus on the new uses that they have never been able to do with any 
product before. Having consumers envision the usage of these new benefits may serve the 
dual purpose of leading to higher estimation of the benefits provided by the product while 
also blocking negative thoughts about constraints (or learning costs) associated with how the 
new product might impact existing usage patterns (Feldman and Lynch 1988). Managers 
could think of different ways of to promote the product (e.g. through advertising) in order to 
evoke imaginative focused thoughts about the RNPs. Further, counter to the current notions 
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of providing one or two key benefits to consumers, this essay suggest providing multiple 
tasks associated with the new benefits provided by the RNP may lead to higher evaluations 
and faster adoption in the marketplace. However, encouraging consumers to imagine 
multiple tasks of the RNP without providing specific examples may lead to lower evaluation 
due to difficulty of imagination. For example, for the Segway mentioned at the beginning of 
this essay, the study findings suggest that pushing consumers to go beyond their past 
memories about how they traditionally traveled and instead instructing them to imagine the 
new perspectives provided by the Segway would be a more effective way to increase 
consumers’ evaluation of this new transportation device. At the same time, marketers should 
reduce the difficulty of imagining such new usages by limiting what they ask consumer to 
imagine, or by providing consumers with concrete examples with specific new usage 
scenarios. 
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CHAPTER 5 -- CONCLUSION 
 
The three essays in this dissertation suggest that people tend to rely on one aspect of a 
product that is more accessible and thus perceived to be more diagnostic when they make 
decisions. This unidirectional reliance on one aspect blocks the use of other potentially more 
diagnostic aspects and may lead to negative consequences such as preference inconsistency 
over time or lowered evaluation of RNPs. As one of the major contributions of this 
dissertation, I propose different mental simulation strategies to alter the accessibility of 
neglected product aspects to achieve preference consistency and to enhance new product 
evaluation. Two important dimensions of product aspects were investigated: level of mental 
representation (high level desirability vs. low level feasibility), which was addressed in the 
first two essays, and focus of mental representation (memory vs. imagination focus), which 
was discussed is essay 3.  
In essay 1, I demonstrate that outcome simulation (which augments the desirability 
related thoughts) is more effective in the near future to achieve preference consistency over 
time, while process simulation (which encourages the feasibility considerations) is more 
effective in the distant future to overcome preference inconsistency over time. In essay 2 I 
investigated the domain of new products and find that while the high-level desirability 
considerations related with product benefit appears more accessible than the low-level 
feasibility considerations related with the process of using the product for INPs, RNPs are 
construed with a focus on both the desirability and feasibility considerations. As such, the 
traditional process and outcome simulation do not differ in terms of their effectiveness to 
 
 
 
 
 
  
enhance evaluations for RNPs. However, after unconfounding the effect of cognitive vs. 
affective focus in the traditional mental simulation literature (e.g. Taylor et al. 1998), I 
showed that outcome simulation is more effective to increase the evaluation of RNPs than 
process simulation under a cognitive information processing mode, whereas the reversal is 
true under an affective processing mode. I further demonstrated that degree of planning and 
certainty with the product are partial mediators for this effect.  
In essay 3 I switched to a different dimension of people’s mental representations of a 
new product: memory vs. imagination-focused mental representations. Essay 3 examined 
people’s visualization focus for RNPs and showed that people naturally rely on the most 
readily accessible images from their memory while neglecting the imaginative new activities 
when they evaluated RNPs, leading to lowered evaluation of RNPs. I proposed and tested the 
effect of an imaginative-focused visualization strategy, which enhances the naturally 
neglected imaginative new uses of the RNPs and leads to higher evaluations. In addition, the 
studies indicate that ease of imagination directly impacts product evaluation for RNPs (i.e. 
more ease leads to higher evaluation).  
These findings have important implications for research on choice over time and new 
product evaluation. In the domain of choice over time, where temporal distance has a great 
impact on level of mental representation and ultimately on people’s decisions, the natural 
temporal pattern of consumer preference could be modified or even reversed by different 
types of mental simulation (i.e. outcome simulation for near future or process simulation for 
distant future). In the domain of new product learning, level of mental representation was 
identified as a key difference between products with different level of newness. Further, 
using a unique type of simulation (i.e. cognitive focused outcome simulation or affective 
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focused process simulation) helps increase evaluations for RNPs. At the same time, when 
evaluating RNPs, consumers tend to preserve their cognitive effort and rely on the most 
accessible mental images that are related with past memories, which lowers the evaluation of 
RNPs. However, pushing consumers to use their imagination and focus on imaginative new 
uses leads to higher evaluations, especially when imagination is made easier. 
As another main contribution of this dissertation, the findings add significantly to the 
mental simulation literature: Essay 1 took the temporal perspective and offered a possible 
explanation for the contradictory findings in the mental simulation literature in terms of the 
relative effectiveness of process vs. outcome simulation (Taylor et al. 1998; Taylor and Pham 
1999). I found that studies indicating a positive role of process simulation were based on 
distant future events where feasibility-related thoughts were naturally less accessible, 
whereas research showing a positive role of outcome simulation was based on imminent 
events where desirability-focused thoughts were naturally ignored. Thus, different types of 
simulation played a complementary role in terms of activating the naturally less accessible 
mental representation at a different point of time and became more effective for events with 
different temporal distances.  
Essay 2 identified the possible confounds in the traditional mental simulation 
literature between type of simulation (process vs. outcome) and information processing mode 
(cognitive vs. affective) by revealing that process simulation had more of a cognitive mode 
whereas outcome simulation had more of an affective mode (Taylor et al. 1998).  Essay 2 
tested the effect of each type of simulation under a specific information processing mode on 
the evaluation of RNPs and found that each type had a unique effect in increasing evaluation, 
depending on the processing mode. Essay 3 added to the accessibility literature by taking an 
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anticipatory perspective and testing the ease of creating new product usages, instead of a 
traditional retrospective testing the ease of retrieving from past experiences (Schwarz et al. 
1991; Schwarz 1998). Our results confirmed the applicability of the role of experienced ease 
in the evaluation of RNPs. 
In sum, this dissertation builds on the “accessibility-diagnosticity framework” 
(Feldman and Lynch 1988; Menon and Raghubir 2003) and extends it by showing that using 
mental simulation to activate the diagnosticity of the naturally less accessible mental images 
leads to preference consistency over time and increased evaluations of RNPs. At the same 
time, this dissertation contributes to the simulation literature by proposing an explanation to 
the present conflicting findings and a potential confound in this literature (Tayler et al. 1998), 
as well as testing the efficacy of experienced ease from an anticipatory perspective beyond 
the traditional retrospective view (Schwarz et al. 1991; Schwarz 1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
 
 
  
APPENDIX A 
ESSAY 1: EXPERIMENT 1 (ASSIGNMENT CHOICE) 
 
Stimuli: 
 
Imagine that you are required to turn in a class assignment in a week [at the beginning 
of next semester]. The assignment requires reading a chapter and discussing a number 
of questions about it. There are two topics that you could choose. Topic A is very 
interesting, but requires lots of effort. Topic B is not as interesting, but only requires 
reasonable effort.  
 
You need to choose one of these two topics to submit in a week [at the beginning of 
next semester]. 
  
    Topic A: very interesting, but requires lots of effort  
Topic B: moderately interesting, but only requires reasonable effort  
 
 
 
 
Mental Simulation Manipulations: 
 
Process Simulation: 
“Think about a difficult (an easy) assignment you have worked on in the past. Imagine 
how much time and effort you are going to spend on the assignment if you choose topic 
A (topic B).” 
 
Outcome Simulation 
“Think about an interesting (uninteresting) assignment you have worked on in the past. 
Imagine how you are going to benefit from completing the assignment if you choose 
topic A (topic B).”  
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APPENDIX B 
ESSAY 1: EXPERIMENT 2 (SOFTWARE CHOICE) 
 
Stimuli:   
 
Assume that you have an important project (creating a photo essay) for one of your 
classes that needs to be submitted in two days [at the beginning of next semester]. The 
project requires the use of a photo essay software package. There are two software 
packages available that would allow you to complete this project. Both software packages 
have free trial versions that can be downloaded from the web and are valid for 48 hours, 
which should give you enough time to complete the project. All projects will be graded 
and then posted on the web. 
 
Below are the two software packages to choose from for your project due in two days [at 
the beginning of next semester]. 
 
 
 Software Package A Software Package B 
 
PC Magazine 
Quality Rating 
  
 
Excerpt from 
Review 
 
 
“…allows for the creation of 
fabulous photo essays, but 
difficult and time consuming to 
learn and use…” 
 
 
“…some limitations of final 
layout and editing options, but 
simple to use, easy to learn, and 
gets the job done… 
 
Initial set-up 
 
Large file size 
Downloading, installation, and 
tutorial take about 45 min. 
 
 
Small file size  
Downloading, installation, and 
tutorial take about 10 minutes. 
 
Ease of 
procedure 
 
Medium difficulty level
 
Low difficulty level
 
Advanced 
features
 
Complete image editing features 
(numerous pre-designed themes 
and improved layout tools) 
 
 
Some image editing features 
(limited themes and basic layout 
tools) 
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APPENDIX C 
ESSAY 1: EXPERIMENT 2 (SOFTWARE CHOICE) 
 
 
Mental Simulation Manipulations: 
 
Process Simulation 
Imagine the process of using software package A (B). As you imagine, focus on the 
procedure of using this software to create your project. Imagine how you would feel 
while you are using this software to create your project. That is, focus on the process of 
using software package A (B) to complete your project – focus on how you would feel 
as you are using this software. 
 
Outcome Simulation 
Imagine the final outcome of using software package A (B). As you imagine, focus on 
the quality of the project created with this software. Imagine how you would feel after 
your project is created with this software. That is, focus on the final outcome of your 
project completed with software package A (B) – focus on how you would feel from 
obtaining the result of using this software. 
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APPENDIX D 
ESSAY 2 & 3: PRODUCT INFORMATION SHEET FOR THE INP 
 
“The XI-100 is the mobile product for people on the go!” 
 
 
                                                           
      
 
The XI-100 ultra-portable notebook gives users outstanding 
performance in a small and light notebook 
 
• Keyboard light to illuminate the keyboard in low-light.  
• Titanium Cover provides extra-light and enhanced 
durability.  
• Extended life battery allows up to 4 hours computing. 
• Optimized for connectivity with flexible connection options 
• Lightweight (weighs about 4.5 pounds) 
• 14" TFT screen 
• Intel® Pentium® M processor at 1.73GHz  
• 3 year limited warranty 
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APPENDIX E 
ESSAY 2 & 3: PRODUCT INFORMATION SHEET FOR THE RNP 
“The XI-100 is the mobile product for people on the go!” 
 
 
 
The XI-100 ultra-portable notebook gives users outstanding 
performance in a small and light notebook 
 
• Biometric smart pen recognizes, stores, and converts 
handwritten text 
• Chip based audio recorder synchronizes with handwritten 
notes 
• PDF file enhancer allows for onscreen annotation 
• Wearable computer attachment has eye glass mounted 
LCD display  
• Lightweight (weighs about 4.5 pounds) 
• 14” TFT screen 
• Intel® Pentium® M processor at 1.73GHz 
• 3 year limited warranty 
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APPENDIX F 
ESSAY 2: SUMMARY OF MENTAL SIMULATION MANIPULATIONS 
Experiment 1 (INP vs. RNP x Process vs. Outcome Simulation) 
Process simulation: 
In the following visualization exercise, please imagine the process of using the XI-100. 
As you imagine, focus on how you would incorporate the XI-100 into your daily routine. 
Imagine how you would feel while you are using this product for your school work. 
That is, focus on the process of using the XI-100.  
 
Outcome simulation: 
In the following visualization exercise, please imagine the end benefits of using the XI-
100. As you imagine, focus on the end benefits of using the XI-100 in your daily routine. 
Imagine how you would feel as a result of improving your school work by using this 
product. That is, focus on the end benefits of using the XI-100. 
 
 
Experiment 2 (Process vs. Outcome Simulation x Cognitive vs. Affective Focus) 
 
Cognitive oriented process simulation:  
While you are looking at the advertising on the following page, we would like you to 
focus on the specific features of this product and imagine the process of using this 
product. As you imagine, focus on how you would incorporate this product into your 
daily routine. 
Affective oriented process simulation:  
While you are looking at the advertising on the following page, we would like you to 
focus on the specific emotions that you may feel during the process of using this 
product. As you imagine, focus on how you would feel while incorporating this product 
into your daily routine. 
 
Cognitive oriented outcome simulation:  
While you are looking at the advertising on the following page, we would like you to 
focus on the specific benefits of using this product and imagine the outcome of using 
this product. As you imagine, focus on the specific benefits that you would receive after 
using this product. 
 
Affective oriented outcome simulation:  
While you are looking at the advertising on the following page, we would like you to 
focus on the specific emotions that you may feel after receiving the benefits of using this 
product. As you imagine, focus on how you would feel about the outcome of using this 
product. 
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APPENDIX G 
ESSAY 3: SUMMARY OF VISUALIZATION INSTRUCTIONS 
Experiment 1 (INP vs. RNP x Memory vs. Imagination-Focused Visualization) 
Free visualization: 
Visualizing activities with the XI-100, may help you evaluate the XI-100. Please free 
your mind to visualize these activities (i.e. think about ways you will use computers) as 
you evaluate the XI-100. 
 
Imagination-focused visualization: 
Unleashing your imagination and visualizing new activities that you have never been 
able to do with computers before, may help you evaluate the XI-100. Please push 
yourself to visualize these new activities (i.e. think about new ways you will use 
computers) as you evaluate the XI-100. 
 
 
Experiment 2 (INP vs. RNP x Producing 1 vs. 8 Activities) 
 
Please push yourself to use your imagination and envision one new activity [eight new 
activities] that you have never been able to do with computers before, but will be able 
to do with the XI-100. 
 
Experiment 3  (INP vs. RNP x Visualization Aids with 8 vs. 1 Activity) 
 
Please push yourself to use your imagination and envision new activities that you have 
never been able to do with computers before, but will be able to do with the XI-100. 
 
Below are eight examples of activities [an example of an activity] that you could 
envision as you imagine the new uses of the XI-100. 
 
• Carrying the lightweight computer with you all over campus 
• Taking notes in class that you can paste directly into handouts (e.g., 
Powerpoint) 
• Bringing to a sporting event to capture and dictate audio and writing a blog 
of what is happening. 
• Writing directly on PDF and reading my notes on the handouts 
• Typing and working in the dark with lighted keyboard 
• Audio recording a professors lecture and replaying portions of the lecture 
when reviewing and studying for test 
• Watching an entire movie on a plane without the battery dying  
• Signing electronic documents and transfer with computer signature 
 
The second example (Taking notes in class that you can paste directly into handouts 
(e.g., Powerpoint) was used for the 1 example condition.  
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FIGURE 1: ESSAY 1 -- EXPEERIMENT 1 RESULTS 
 
PREFERENCE INSTABILITY VANISHES  
WITH OUTCOME OR PROCESS SIMULATION 
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Notes: A higher score represents greater preferences toward the higher-feasibility option. 
 
   *   *   * 
 
-- How strongly would you prefer one topic over the other to submit next week?  
 
Strongly prefer 
Topic A  
Strongly prefer 
Topic B 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
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FIGURE 2: ESSAY 1 -- EXPEERIMENT 2 RESULTS 
 
PREFERENCE INSTABILITY VANISHES 
WITH OUTCOME OR PROCESS SIMULATION 
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Notes: A higher score represents greater preferences toward the higher-feasibility option. 
 
   *   *   * 
 
-- How strong is your relative preference between the two software packages?  (circle one) 
 
 
Strongly 
Prefer  
Software A 
  
Indifferent  
between  
A and B 
  
Strongly 
Prefer 
Software B 
 
 1  
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
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FIGURE 3: ESSAY 2 -- PILOT STUDY RESULTS 
 
MENTAL REPRESENTATION OF DESIRABILITY  
VS. FEASIBILITY-RELATED THOUGHTS 
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Notes: A higher score represents a higher amount of thoughts. 
 
   *   *   * 
 
-- How much did you think about the process of using the XI-100? 
 
Not at all     1       2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9    A lot 
 
 
-- How much did you think about the end benefit of using the XI-100? 
 
Not at all     1       2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9    A lot 
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FIGURE 4A: ESSAY 2 -- EXPERIMENT 1 RESULTS 
 
PRODUCT EVALUATION 
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Notes: A higher score represents higher product evaluation. 
 
   *   *   * 
 
-- Evaluation questions 
 
What is your overall evaluation of the XI-100?    1         2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Bad                                                                       Good 
How would you rate the XI-100? 
 
   1         2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Poor                                                               Excellent 
Do you think the XI-100 is an excellent product?    1         2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Not at all                                                       Definitely 
Your attitude towards the XI-100 is:    1         2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Dislike                                                                   Like 
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FIGURE 4B: ESSAY 2 -- EXPERIMENT 1 RESULTS 
 
PURCHASE INTEREST 
 
3
4
5
6
INP RNP
P
ur
ch
as
e 
in
te
re
st
Process simulation
Outcome simulation
 
Notes: A higher score represents higher purchase interest. 
 
   *   *   * 
 
-- Purchase Interest Questions  
 
How interested would you be in purchasing the XI-100?    1       2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Not at all                                       Very Interested 
How seriously would you consider the XI-100? 
 
   1       2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Not at all                                         Very seriously 
What is the likelihood that you would buy the XI-100?    1       2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Not at all likely                                     Very likely 
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FIGURE 5A: ESSAY 2 -- EXPERIMENT 2 RESULTS 
 
PRODUCT EVALUATION 
 
5
6
7
Cognitive focus Affective focus
Pr
od
uc
t E
va
lu
at
io
n
process simulation
outcome simulation
 
Notes: A higher score represents higher product evaluation. 
 
   *   *   * 
 
-- Evaluation questions 
 
What is your overall evaluation of the XI-100?    1         2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Bad                                                                       Good 
How would you rate the XI-100? 
 
   1         2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Poor                                                               Excellent 
Do you think the XI-100 is an excellent product?    1         2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Not at all                                                       Definitely 
Your attitude towards the XI-100 is:    1         2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Dislike                                                                   Like 
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FIGURE 5B: ESSAY 2 -- EXPERIMENT 2 RESULTS 
 
PURCHASE INTEREST 
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Notes: A higher score represents higher purchase interest. 
 
   *   *   * 
 
-- Purchase Interest Questions  
 
How interested would you be in purchasing the XI-100?    1       2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Not at all                                       Very Interested 
How seriously would you consider the XI-100? 
 
   1       2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Not at all                                         Very seriously 
What is the likelihood that you would buy the XI-100?    1       2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Not at all likely                                     Very likely 
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FIGURE 6: ESSAY 3 -- EXPERIMENT 1 RESULTS 
 
PRODUCT EVALUATION 
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Notes: A higher score represents higher product evaluation. 
 
   *   *   * 
 
-- Evaluation questions 
 
What is your overall evaluation of the XI-100?    1         2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Bad                                                                       Good 
How would you rate the XI-100? 
 
   1         2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Poor                                                               Excellent 
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FIGURE 7: ESSAY 3 -- EXPERIMENT 2 RESULTS 
 
PRODUCT EVALUATION 
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Notes: A higher score represents higher product evaluation. 
 
   *   *   * 
 
-- Evaluation questions 
 
What is your overall evaluation of the XI-100?    1         2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Bad                                                                       Good 
How would you rate the XI-100? 
 
   1         2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Poor                                                               Excellent 
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FIGURE 8: ESSAY 3 -- EXPERIMENT 3 RESULTS 
 
PRODUCT EVALUATION 
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Notes: A higher score represents higher product evaluation. 
 
   *   *   * 
 
-- Evaluation questions 
 
What is your overall evaluation of the XI-100?    1         2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Bad                                                                       Good 
How would you rate the XI-100? 
 
   1         2        3         4         5        6        7       8     9 
Poor                                                               Excellent 
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